MILITARY CHAPLAINS' REVIEW

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MILITARY CHAPLAINS'

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PREFACE

The *Military Chaplains' Review* is designed as a medium in which those interested in the military chaplaincy can share with chaplains the product of their experience and research. We welcome articles which are directly concerned with supporting and strengthening chaplains professionally. Preference will be given to those articles having lasting value as reference material.

The *Military Chaplains' Review* is published quarterly. The opinions reflected in each article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the view of the Chief of Chaplains or the Department of the Army.

Articles should be submitted in duplicate, double spaced, to the Editor, Military Chaplains' Review, United States Army Chaplain Board, Fort Wadsworth, Staten Island, New York 10305. Articles should be approximately 8 to 18 pages in length and, when appropriate, should be carefullly footnoted.

EDITOR

Chaplain (LTC) John J. Hoogland May 1971–June 1974
Chaplain (LTC) Joseph E. Galle III July 1974–

THE BEST AND THE WORST OF TIMES

One of our dilemmas is that our knowledge is about the past, but our decisions are about the future. We learn from the past, but how helpful is history in the midst of the radical change we are experiencing. We have few precedents to guide us through these kaleidoscopic times. So much has happened: two global wars, nuclear fission, population explosion, cybernetics, Freud, Stravinsky, Picasso, Ionesco, moon landings, Telstar, euthanasia, wonder drugs, heart transplants, computers, credit cards, robots, ethnic revolutions, the Beatles, and an assassinated President. These, along with a list of other events from our recent past, tend to convey not only a sense of change, but of loss—the sound of a door shutting to the past.

To say we are caught between a past that is much different from the present, and a future that we know will be immeasurably different from both—is commonplace. We are slowly realizing, however, that one age has ended, but the new one has not yet begun.

Charles Dickens wrote:

> It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the other way. . . .

Though written in 1859, these lines somewhat prophetically, if not disturbingly, describe the contemporary situation. A large amount of uncertainty exists, especially about the future, and that's where you and I will spend the rest of our lives.

Those who wrote for this issue of the *Review* recognize the "best" and the "worst," the "wisdom" and the "foolishness," the "hope" and the "despair" of the times. They, however, carry us further by allowing us to view the future through their eyes. Each seems to suggest that we will have a future, but that we must take charge of it today. We are to participate in our future even now, building it with whatever materials we possess, and move into it with hope. Along with hope we are reminded to carry with us honesty, responsibility, humility and love whose potential has yet to be fully appropriated in any society.

For better or for worse the future is pressing upon us. The decisions we must make are not easy ones. By maintaining our trust in God and each other, by cherishing the vision of what we are capable of becoming and to cherish the development of the

same in others, by enjoying lifelong intellectual and spiritual growth, by cultivating the capacity to feel and express love and joy, tragedy and grief, and by viewing humanity as one while respecting diversity and difference today—tomorrow humanity might be able to say, "These are the best of times."

ORRIS E. KELLY
Chaplain (Major General), USA
Chief of Chaplains

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MILITARY CHAPLAINS' REVIEW

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THE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE

Chaplain (LTC) David G. Boyce

Change is the passage from potentiality to actuality.
—Aristotle

You cannot step into the same river twice.
—Heraclitus

Where there is no vision the people perish.
—Ancient Proverb

Change is basic to the human condition. It is very much a fact of life. There is a real degree of certainty about change. Day changes to night. Night changes to day. Change is a given. The part that is not so certain is whether change will manage us or we will manage it.

That is what the art and discipline of futurology is all about—the management of change. The art includes three parts: change that is probable, change that is possible, and change that is preferable.

Probable changes have been anticipated by individuals and organizations such as the Rand Corporation, the Hudson Institute, the Club of Rome, the Institute for the Future and the Brookings Institute. Some of the management of change methodologies for ascertaining probable changes used by these organizations are the Delphi technique, systems dynamic computer model, econometric model, extrapolation technique, cross-impact analysis, gaming, brain storming, expert panels, Bayesian statistics, Markov chain theory, Monte Carlo technique, and the scenario.

Using the systems dynamic computer model, the Club of Rome formulated and published *The Limits to Growth* in 1972. Made up of a group of scientists and industrialists, the authors of this report collected global data about world population, food supplies, pollution and industrial raw materials. The report explains how each of these variables will rise and fall during the next one hundred years. The conclusion reached is that present trends will bring about the collapse of civilization before the year 2100 unless drastic restrictions are placed on economic and technological growth.

Another methodology for anticipating change is the Delphi technique. This is a survey method in which several experts are asked to respond to one or more questionnaires sent through

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the mail. They are normally asked to make judgments about when and under what conditions certain events are likely to occur. Their opinions, which usually cover a wide range, are collected and used as the basis of a second questionnaire which asks the same experts to make the same judgments called for in the first questionnaire, now in the light of the collected range of opinion. Thus, the experts may (or may not) modify their original estimates after receiving feedback from other experts. This process can be repeated several times until a consensus is reached.

Using the Delphi technique, Rand Corporation, one of the well known think-tanks, provided the following list of probable changes by the year 2000.

New food sources will have opened up through large-scale ocean farming and fabrication of synthetic proteins. Controlled thermonuclear power will be a source of energy. New raw materials will be derived from the oceans. Regional weather control will be past the experimental stage. General immunization against bacterial and viral diseases will be available. Primitive forms of artificial life will have been generated in the laboratory. The correction of hereditary defects will be possible. Automation will have advanced from menial robot services to sophisticated, high IQ machines. A universal language will have evolved through automated communication. On the moon there will be mining and manufacturing of propellant materials. Humans will have landed on Mars.

Another management of change methodology is the scenario. This is a narrative in which the author puts together a series of events that might conceivably take place in the future. The rationale for the author's belief in the probability of such a sequence usually derives from a trend extrapolation or analysis of expert opinion. By working the data into a narrative, the author can often make a convincing case for the probability of occurrence.

Herman Kahn of Hudson Institute and Paul Ehrlich are especially adept at the use of this technique. The opening paragraph of Ehrlich's essay "Eco-Catastrophe," included in Alvin Toffler's *The Futurists*, serves as a good example of the scenario technique.

> The end of the ocean came late in the summer of 1979, and it came even more rapidly than the biologists had expected. There had been signs for more than a decade, commencing with the discovery in 1968 that DDT slows down photosynthesis in marine plant life. It was announced in a short paper in the technical journal, *Science*, but to ecologists it smacked of doomsday. They knew that all life in the sea depends on photosynthesis, the chemical process by which green plants bind the sun's energy and make it available to living things. And they know

that DDT and similar chlorinated hydocarbons had polluted the entire surface of the earth, including the sea.

This scenario, written in 1969, takes a current piece of data (the discovery of the relationship of DDT and photosynthesis) and projects a future occurrence (the end of the ocean) based on expert opinion (ecologists). Ehrlich is not really forecasting what will happen, but what *could* happen if we do nothing to stop it. Many scenarios are calls to action and, because of their dramatic format, they are often effective. Because of the efforts of Ehrlich and others, DDT was banned and much less of it now finds its way into the oceans.

So far, we have been looking at probable change and some of the techniques used to anticipate such change—Delphi, scenario and systems dynamic computer model. The next step deals with possible change.

Possible change is the second category subsumed under the management of change rubric. The management of change methodologies for ascertaining possible changes include philosophical speculation, scientific speculation and science fiction literature.

Since 1516 when Thomas Moore described that distant island which he gave the name Utopia ("nowhere"), many designs have been created to describe the ideal life and the best of all possible worlds; and from an earlier time, out of the Golden Age of Greece, came Plato's *Republic.*

Another Golden Age is described by a modern day Utopist, Robert Jastrov. He contends that science has opened the door on the new Golden Age of Man—the Age of Leisure—in which all are freed from the pressures of the environment. A new type of average man will populate this high-technology, low-population society, a man who is relaxed and noncompetitive. The traits of resourcefulness, drive, and motivation will be preserved but at a much reduced level of intensity, in accordance with their reduced importance. The work ethic will also persist, at the minimal level needed to keep the high standard of living in repair. Technological innovations will have a disruptive influence on the stable economy of that future time and will acquire a negative social value, leading eventually to their virtual disappearance.

In this Age of Leisure, the cultivation of the arts will continue but at a low level of achievement. Many people will pursue creative activities in a leisurely manner, but the creation of a great work of art or literature requires a punishing self-discipline that surely will become an ever rarer trait in the Age of Leisure than it is today. There will be a major decline in the vigor of technology, science, and the arts. War will vanish from

the planet. The relaxed society of the Age of Leisure will be stable with the traits of aggression and competitiveness pretty well bred out of the human stock. A new type of individual will exist possessing a new psyche well adapted to the unpressured circumstances of that world.

In addition to the philosophical speculation of Utopias, there is another technique used to anticipate possible change. It is the methodology of scientific speculation.

A Princeton University physicist, Gerard K. O'Neill, postulates that an earth-like space colony could be orbiting our planet by 1990. The colony's 10,000 inhabitants would enjoy green plants, animals, plains, valleys, hills and streams. The colonists would pay off the cost of building their far-out home by manufacturing satellite solar power stations, which would supply cheap, virtually inexhaustable power to the earth.

This highly industrialized, self-maintaining human community in free space would be located along L5, an orbit of the moon where free solar energy is available full time. The community would be constructed on a short time scale, without depending on rocket engines any more advanced than the space shuttle. The costs would be greatly minimized by getting almost all the construction materials from the surface of the moon.

The space community would process lunar surface raw materials into metals, ceramics, glass and oxygen for the construction of additional communities and for products such as satellite solar power stations. The power stations, when completed, would be relocated in orbit around the earth to supply electrical power from low density microwave beams.

Another scientific speculation, this time from a contemporary astronomer, tends to stretch the imagination. N. S. Kardashev has done some speculating about intelligent civilizations in the universe. He postulates that a planetary civilization will go through three main phases. Phase one is like our present world that draws on the energy resources of a single planet. Phase two occurs when the entire solar system is utilized—the giant planets, like Jupiter in our own solar system being dismantled and displaced to use their raw materials. (We have touched the edge of phase two by putting men on the moon and by sending an unmanned spaceship, Pioneer 10, out of our solar system on its way to the stars.) Phase three is reached, says Dr. Kardashev, when whole sections of a galaxy are being utilized. (The galaxy to which our sun belongs contains about 100 billion suns. It is about 100,000 light years from end to end.)

A well known person in science, Wernher von Braun, has done some speculating about life in the twenty-first century. He postulates that by the middle of the next century, a colony of

more than a hundred thousand people will be living on the moon. In the midst of that colony, a moon baby will be born.

That child, having grown up on one-sixth gravity, and equipped with the brilliant technological devices that life on the moon will demand, will never want to live permanently on earth. The gravity of the home planet will oppress that person as if he were six times his actual weight. Earth's political and economic systems will appear to him, both chaotic and dangerous and the presence of many more bacteria in the air will require so many inoculations as to make the visit to earth unacceptable.

Philosophical speculation is interesting and scientific speculation is mind-boggling, but there is still another management of change methodology for anticipating possible change. It is called science fiction literature.

Science fiction has a very high batting average in anticipating possible futures. The society depicted by Aldous Huxley over thirty years ago in *Brave New World* becomes more of a reality every day. Our astronauts walked on the moon in space suits amazingly like those described in science fiction more than fifty years ago.

In a *Sports Illustrated* science fiction story, William Hjortsberg describes the sports scene in America in the year 2032. Pro football is as popular as ever but the players are all superior athletes who have been genetically engineered to specification and then cloned to provide an endless supply of "super Jocks" to keep the American sports fan happy.

Another science fiction story deals with the problem of over population. In a high-technology, high-population society, *coordination of events will become crucial.* Machines will be running things and to make machines wait will cost money. Coordination will also be important because of the increased demand on various facilities the large population will effect. In order to accommodate the large number of people, rotation of use-times and around-the-clock scheduling may be commonplace for restaurants, recreation facilities, business facilities and even living spaces.

In a story by Harlan Ellison, this possibility is taken to the extreme and a world is portrayed where everybody begins with a "fixed" lifetime. Every second that the individual is late for business, recreation or anything, is deducted from the person's allotted span. Time is kept by the Ticktock Man. When a person's late time equals the time the individual has to live, that person is terminated. This is just one possibility for a world with a population of forty to fifty billion people, run by high IQ machines.

We have considered the first two parts of the management of

change, probable changes and possible changes. Now let us examine the third leg of the triad, *preferable change.*

In order to manage change effectively, it is very helpful to know what changes are probable and what changes are possible. *However, in the final analysis, the individual must determine what changes are preferable and what kind of future is personally desired.* After all the reports are in, when all the stories have been told, when all the indicators have been reviewed, the bottom line of futurology (change management) has three parts: clarification of one's values, ordering of one's priorities and making the necessary commitments.

In our society, economic values are usually high on the scale—job, career, pay check, promotion, and property. Decisions are often made on the basis of great weight being given to economic values. The individual members of our society will make decisions about preferable change and preferred futures according to how much weight they give to economic values (job), social system values (human rights), and technological values (automation).

In our collective life together, the decision-makers that we have elected to local and national office will make decisions about preferable changes and the future of our society based on the weight that they *perceive* their constituents give to social system values, technological values and economic values. If environmental stability is a value, then environmental decay is a problem. If social justice is a value, then social injustice is a problem. If economic well being is a value, then poverty is a problem. If peace is a value, then war is a problem.

Since we know that we will die, we go about writing "Kilroy was here" on other individuals and on the environment. Perhaps the management of change will help provide better ways to write "Kilroy was here."

A major oil company has keyed into the concept of preferred changes. It has started an ad campaign called "Celebrate America's Tricentennial 100 Years Early." The campaign will be used to solicit ideas from the public "pertinent to America's future. . . . America will change a great deal by the year 2076, and we want you to tell us what you think these changes should be."

To manage change in our individual lives is practical wisdom. To manage change in our collective lives is of crucial importance. If we grasp the concept that the world will see many changes in the next twenty-five years, if we have ordered our priorities and have clearly understood our own personal value system, then we will be more likely to create the kind of future that we want.

We will then be in the happy position of actively and assertively managing change rather than ineffectively milling around letting change manage us.

TOWARD THE TRICENTENNIAL

Frederik Pohl

I am a science fiction writer, which means I spend my working life making up fantastic stories about adventures in strange places and times. I began doing this when I was seventeen and now almost forty years later, a grandfather, I am still doing the same thing. There are some differences to be sure. Science fiction has become immensely more respectable than it was in the 30s; colleges teach it as part of the regular curriculum, foundations support it, even governments acknowledge its existence. The audiences are far larger—some hundreds of millions of people have read my own stories, in some forty languages all around the world. But when you come right down to it, what I do for a career is pretty close to what I did as the idle recreation of a rather immature teenager, and every now and then I confront a question that goes something like: "Isn't that a funny way for a grown man to spend his life?"

I have an answer to that. I've borrowed it from my friend and colleague Arthur C. Clarke; when he was asked why he wrote science fiction in preference to anything else, he said, "Because it's the only literature that is concerned with reality."

That may be a strange claim to make for a kind of writing that has often concerned itself with bug-eyed monsters from the planets of Procyon. But it's true. The great reality of our time is *change*. And change is what science fiction is all about. Other novelists, poets, essayists, historians—they are in the business of recording it as it happens. Science fiction writers are in the business of anticipating it before it becomes real.

The great truth about change is not only that it is happening, not even that it is happening more rapidly than ever before, but that the *rate* of change is accelerating all the time. The United States in the year of its bicentennial is far different from the fledgling agricultural federation of 1776. The United States at the time of its tricentennial, a hundred years from now, will be almost unrecognizable, in fundamental ways.

Not even a science fiction writer can guess at some of those changes, but a few are rather clear: tomorrow's realities, the realities of the tricentennial year.

What are these realities?

Besides serving as the President of the Science Fiction Writers of America organization, Mr. Pohl is much sought after as an author and lecturer. His published works, too numerous to list here, total more than seventy books, hundreds of articles and dozens of essays and special think pieces.

The first and foremost is the reality of high-cost energy. We are never again going to see thirty-cent-a-gallon gasoline.

There is a good chance that by the tricentennial year of 2076 that fact will have been accepted and absorbed into the social structure, and life will go on as happily, productively and rewardingly as it is possible for human life to be. But between now and then the human race is going to experience an energy famine, so that the electricity you use to light your homes and the gasoline you use to drive a car will all increase at least tenfold in cost—real cost; the equivalent of today's dollars, regardless of whatever play-money figures inflation may produce. There simply is no way to avoid it.

Of course, we have all heard of marvelous new energy sources which are coming into existence, and we have been promised that, one way or another, they will give us the energy we need: nuclear fission plants, breeder reactors, hydrogen fusion from the sea, shale oil from the Rockies, the tar sands of Canada, geothermal power from the heat inside the earth, wind power, wave power, sun power. None of these is a fantasy, exactly; but neither is any one of them exactly real.

I could spend more space than I have available discussing the realities of each of these proposed energy sources, but they all seem to fail in one of three ways. Some fail on the grounds of unacceptable damage to the environment. Some fail on the simple arithmetic of net gain of energy: if you count all the costs, you find you are putting more energy into the process than you get out as fuel. And some fail purely because of the high capital costs they entail; they will produce plenty of energy, but at a price so high in construction that the energy must be sold for many times its present cost.

For example: There's no doubt that there is plenty of energy available from wind power. Holland pumped its polders dry with windmills, western farmers watered their cattle with wind-driven pumps; at Grandpa's Knob, Vermont, a generation ago, the Smith-Putnam wind generator was rated at 1.25 megawatts and successfully fed power into the Vermont grid all through World War II. But it is more than thirty years since Grandpa's Knob produced a watt of electricity, because it simply was not competitive with electricity generated from cheap oil. It will become competitive again, to be sure—but not at 1945 prices, and probably not at 1976 prices.

The question of net energy return is crucial to any estimate of energy resources. A million tons of oil *in situ* is not the same as a million tons delivered to a refinery, to be made into gasoline for your car. There are places in America where all you have to

do is poke a stick in the ground and stand back; oil comes pouring forth—or did; most of those fields have long since been exploited. Saudi Arabian oil lies much deeper, but once the wells are dug it comes out cheaply and easily. Oil under the North Sea is something else again: the technology required is at the very limits of scientific knowledge, the costs are immense and the uncertainties serious. And to secure oil from the shale rock of Utah and Colorado may well be a losing proposition under any circumstances. One expert's estimate is that, while it is perfectly possible to mine the rock, cook it, extract kerogen and distill it into oil, pipe it to where it is needed and refine it into commercially valuable products, the energy requirements are such that for every gallon of gasoline you get out of the refinery you may well have expended *more* than one gallon to get it there.

Almost the same arguments apply to atomic power—at least, of the kind we now take for granted, from light-water fission reactors. It takes uranium to fuel them. There is a great deal of uranium in the world, but most of it is in very dilute concentrations, very expensive to extract. The most productive mines are already in operation, and their output (it is called "yellowcake") is rather fully committed. Some experts say that any atomic power plant completed after 1976 will have to face an uncertainty as to whether yellowcake will be available to fuel it for its operational life. There are other possible kinds of fission power plants, but the other varieties have flaws of their own, not least of which is that few can be on-line producers in time to alleviate the energy crunch.

A more serious flaw is the well-known danger of plutonium-235. Pu^{235} is the stuff atomic bombs are made of; it is also highly toxic chemically, physically perilous in a radioactive sense, and long-lived. The wastes from a breeder reactor are a political danger as soon as the system begins to operate: the risk of terrorists acquiring the few pounds of plutonium necessary to make an atomic bomb raises problems that have never had to be solved before, starting with the capacity for a tiny group to threaten any city in the world with the fate of Hiroshima. The same wastes remain a danger to every living thing for a period so long that it can scarcely be comprehended: a quarter of a million years, fifty times as long as all of recorded history.

It is the danger to the environment which finally dooms most of the proposals for major new energy sources. Even if you can protect plutonium from hijacking . . . even if you can find ways to deal with poisonous by-products and cure the damage of air, water and soil pollution . . . even if science succeeds in solving all the technological problems and society accepts the

costs . . . even so, there is one danger innate to all energy sources that rely on chemical or nuclear combustion:

Heat.

Every time you split an atom or burn a crumb of coal you release heat into the environment. And every year we release more heat than the year before, four or five percent more each year, like compound interest. According to Constantine Generales, the human race has been doing this since the time of the Minoans, 3400 years ago; and, he adds, if we keep on doing it for another 3400 years we will be releasing so much heat into the atmosphere that the temperature of the surface of the Earth will be the same as the temperature at the surface of the sun.

Clearly, long before that we would all be dead.

Equally clearly, that is a long way off, and surely the human race would stop its increase in the use of energy sometime before the year 5400 A.D. But when? We don't have to reach the temperature of the sun to destroy every living thing on earth; we only have to reach a mean surface temperature of around 212° Fahrenheit for that—then the oceans boil off as steam. Long before that we melt the polar ice caps and submerge New York and Los Angeles, London and Rio de Janeiro under three hundred feet of ocean. Long before that we change the climate so drastically that Kansas and the Ukraine become deserts. And long before that—no one knows when, some think within the next century, some even within the next few decades—we change the mean annual temperature in certain parts of the world (most particularly and surely our own 48 contiguous states of the U.S.A.) to such an extent that the consequences cannot be foreseen.

The paradox of "limitless" nuclear fusion of the hydrogen from sea water is that even if we had it (and we don't; no one has yet succeeded in generating one net watt of power that way anywhere in the world), we would have to limit our use of it.

What remains to hope for?

In one sense, a great deal. Solar power, for instance. All forms of renewable power in general.

The problems are severe, but they are not intrinsically hopeless. We can safely use every watt of solar, wind, tide or hydroelectric power we can generate, and the ultimate reserves are very large. But they are not infinite; and they cost a great deal in capital construction.

So we come back to two reliable statements: 1, energy is never going to be cheap again—which means that the world is going to have to rethink its ideas of where people live and how they live: possibly the end of the suburbs (because of the wastefulness of

automobile transportation), probably the end of large cities in locations where the climate requires year-round air-conditioning.

And, 2, sooner or later—but the sooner the better—an end to the growth syndrome. There is room for argument as to the exact date when the human race will have to kick the growth habit. There is not much room for arguing about the fact that sooner or later it is inevitable. There is no escape from Generales's heat curve.

I have spent a lot of space on this one argument because my conscience makes me do it. Half the politicians, and nearly all the business leaders, are telling us not to worry. I don't believe we can afford to do that, and so I want to get my message across as clearly as I can: *WORRY*. Worry that we may, in our folly, go on trying to make each year bigger than the year before, more GNP, more per capita wealth, more gadgets in more homes, more people, more of everything. Worry most of all that the people who tell us not to worry will prevail.

But I don't want to paint too black a picture. I believe with all my heart that we can't go on having More and More. But I would not suggest for one second that we can't have Better.

Let's assume a condition worse than anyone believes to be true. Let's make believe that we have as of this bicentennial year reached the absolute maximum of energy production for all time, and that effective immediately the 4% annual increase stops.

Can we deal with this situation without seeing all the comforts and joys of our lives dwindle away?

You bet we can! For openers, probably half the energy generated in the world is purely wasted. If we put our minds to it—if there was any real incentive to do it—we could *reduce* our use of energy 4% a year. The first steps would be as simple as turning off unnecessary lights, walking or bicycling on short errands in nice weather instead of taking a car, setting the thermostat a couple of degrees lower in cold weather, and higher in warm. We know we can do that much; we did it, in the brief flurry of concern after the Arab oil boycott.

The next steps are a little harder, but still not really painful. When you buy a new car, trade down instead of up; smaller cars use less gas. Make the old car do a year or two longer (the energy involved in building a new compact is around 44,000 kilowatt-hours—as much as you spend in driving it for a year.) Design new buildings to be energy-conservative (glass-fronted skyscrapers are only possible if you consider energy so cheap as to be not worth worrying about). Enforce the 55 mph speed limit. (The amount of gas used to overcome air resistance goes

up as the *cube* of the speed. It takes twice as much at 70 mph as it does at 55. Reduce the number of commercial airline flights to fill up the empty seats—the average load factor is not much over 50%, which means that every time 90 people go from California to Hawaii, the airlines burn up almost enough fuel for 180.

Those are all simple enough things; there are a thousand other measures like them, all of which can be done at once. The really big economies are harder, slower and more expensive. But they are not at all impossible, and some of them may well turn out to be rather nice.

The way we build our homes and offices is a conspicuous waste of huge quantities of energy all by itself. Buckminster Fuller points out that if you were going to design a maximally efficient radiator for the purpose of getting rid of heat, what you would come up would likely be a large number of needle-shaped objects pointing into the sky—an exact description of New York City, or almost any other large urban area in the world. Suppose, said Fuller, you put a huge plastic dome over a city like New York. At once you cut your heat loss in winter by something like 90%. Perhaps you do even better, because the right kind of plastic would produce a greenhouse effect, converting the entire city into a kind of hothouse. Does this mean it would be intolerably hot in summer? No! The movement of air through the dome, entering at the bottom and venting at the top, produces its own cooling effect. Students at the University of Science and Technology in Kumasi, Ghana, built a 70-foot Fuller dome for the Accra fairgrounds: its natural, energy-free air-conditioning worked so well they called it "the chilling machine".

Carry it a step farther. Inside the dome you don't want to pollute the air; in fact, you want to refresh it, because it doesn't change very rapidly. So you plant flowers, trees, vines, gardens; the temperature is right, the conditions can be whatever you want them to be, there is no reason New York City could not become a verdant bower.

You can't allow much burning under the dome, because of air pollution. No gasoline-driven cars (but small electrically driven ones, plus rapid subways and trolley-buses). No oil-burners for heat, or coal-fired generating plants for electricity. Those have to be outside the dome. But most of them are there already; land is simply too valuable in the heart of a city to waste it on steam plants. Leave them where they are. As new ones are needed build them, say, near the shores of Long Island Sound. Their emissions can be controlled to eliminate air pollution—it is far easier to do that with large central plants than with a thousand small ones. Generating plants produce another kind of pollution—thermal pollution; the waste hot water left after the

steam has driven the last low pressure turbine and been condensed. Disposing of this has always been a problem, but it can be turned into an asset. Use that water to warm Long Island Sound. Fertilize it with the sterilized sewage of the city itself. Seed it with some kind of food crop—mussels are a good candidate; and Long Island Sound alone can grow enough protein a year to meet the needs of the whole population of the United States.

All this is a major effort, to be sure, but not one that is out of reach. The entire program, timely begun and spread out over a period of years, would cost not a great deal more than we now spend in building and rebuilding cities like New York as a matter of regular routine. And the benefits would be considerable. The dollar saving would be great. The energy saving greater still. And the amenities of the city would be once and for all restored.

In fact, it is not unreasonable to imagine that the city could become more attractive than the countryside, so that suburbanites would yearn to remigrate, leaving the paved and intemperate communities of Connecticut and Westchester for the clean air and verdant greenery of Times Square and Harlem.

Low-energy technology does not have to be bad technology. The transistorized stereo playing in the background as I write costs no more than the Atwater-Kent I listened to as a child, draws far less current and produces an incomparably richer sound. Do you want gadgets?—personalized computers, 3-D TV recordings, instant communications to anywhere in the world from wherever you happen to be? I promise you all of them long before the tricentennial, along with a thousand other inventions it has not yet occurred to us to want.

I promise you a great deal more than that, whether we be energy-poor or not. What I do not promise is that all of the new things we will find we can't live without will be for our good—either in material ways, or in moral.

What would you think, for example, of a little gadget that you could carry in your pocket, no bigger than a pocket watch, that could give you the equivalant of a shot of heroin, just by pushing a button?

That is not a century away. The technology already exists. There are certain areas of the brain called "pleasure centers". If you insert a fine platinum electrode into the pleasure center and stimulate it with a tiny electric current—a few milliamperes—the subject receives a sensation of pure pleasure. If you wire a laboratory animal in this way, a white rat or a guinea pig, and put it in a cage with a switch the animal can operate to give him the jolt of joy, he will learn to push that

switch. Having pushed it once, he will go on pushing it—again and again; he will push the switch over and over, with singleminded persistence, almost oblivious to food or drink or the charms of female animals, until he falls asleep in exhaustion, and wakes to push it some more. Human subjects report the sensation as being great pleasure; so far there have been very few, all persons who have had brain surgery for some other reason. But the installation of the electrode itself need not require major surgery. The external end of the electrode could be concealed beneath the scalp. A pocket battery set could provide the current by induction: touch the joy machine to the head, push the button and experience a jolt of pleasure, any time at all. Apart from the original installation, it is almost free. It does not cause physiological addiction, in fact, it is hard to see any adverse consequences at all short of the moral and character aspects.

More than that. It is not only pleasure centers that can be stimulated. A tiny electrical current applied to other parts of the brain produces quite different effects. At Yale, Dr. Jose Delgado has wired the brain of a bull to a radio receiver so that a person can persuade the bull to charge, fifty yards away Delgado pushes a button on his transmitter and the bull halts in mid-charge and begins to graze. Or the opposite. Scientists have not yet mapped all the areas of the brain, but it seems certain that the key can be found to excite or suppress almost any kind of behavior by electrical stimulation. Can a man be wired to become an assassin? Can a whole army be wired to disregard the instinct for self-preservation? Can any group of people—factory workers or concentration-camp inmates—be wired to dismiss fatigue and pain, and go on working till they die? Very possibly yes to all of them.

All of this is very real; but even if it were not, the opportunities to control human behavior exist in other ways: B. F. Skinner's behavior modification, operant conditioning, whatever.

It seems to me that the questions raised by behavior control bring us face to face with one of the greatest moral problems of the next century, a problem that humanity has never had to face before. Like most moral problems, it will be upon us before we are ready for it. There are those who would put a stop to this sort of research for just that reason, because they do not see how to answer the questions it raises. But the technology itself is value-free. Technology is only a tool, like a hammer. It can be used to build a house, or to beat someone's brains in. It is the way in which it is used that gives it its moral quality, for good or for evil; and probably the hardest question of all is to know which is which.

Freeing a slave from pain so that he can work himself to death for you is obviously Evil. Freeing a terminal cancer patient from pain so that he can live out his last months productively and in peace, it seems to me, is equally obviously Good. Unfortunately the two aspects come as a set; if we buy one, we get the other as well. And we also get all the intermediate aspects, where the morality is far from clear.

For an even more abrasive moral question, let us look at what the biological sciences have in store for us between now and the tricentennial.

Most of us would agree that to save human life by means of an organ transplant is a good thing.

Organ transplants, of course, happen now. But they don't happen as a natural thing to everybody; millions of people still die because of the failure of a vital organ without even an attempt at a transplant. There are many reasons for this. For one, transplants don't always work. The body often rejects them, because their chemistry is not the same as its own, except in the case of identical twins. For another, spare parts are scarce. You cannot transplant a heart to save a life unless some other person has *lost* a life—and conveniently done it in such a way as to leave the heart functioning and intact.

But biology may give us a way to grow spare parts. The procedure is called "cloning".

A clone is an exact genetic copy of an organism. Twenty years ago some people at Ann Arbor, Michigan, succeeded in cloning a carrot. That is, they cut out a piece of a carrot, treated it chemically, and made it grow an exact duplicate of itself. A few years after that some people at Oxford, England, cloned a frog. They took a sample of tissue from a dead frog and by various manipulations they made another frog which was an exact genetic copy of the dead one: an identical twin, conceived and born after the first frog was dead.

Now, no one has yet cloned a human being. But it's in the cards. If we wanted to do it, all we would need to do to bring it about would be to make it the sort of national goal that the atomic bomb and the space program were: a Manhattan Project sort of effort, though probably on a considerably smaller and cheaper scale. We could be pretty sure of making it a reality within a few years—as sure as we were of success with the bomb and the space program, at any rate. Even without such a project, it will probably come about anyway, and long before the tricentennial.

What would this mean?

For openers, it would mean a good prospect of vastly longer life, in nearly perfect health and strength, for any human being

who could take advantage of it. (Really, for any human being who could afford the doubtless very high dollar price.)

The first thing to do is give up a sample of tissue from your own body. It does not need to be very much; the amount your doctor takes for a biopsy would be ample, and perhaps it could be no more than the few cells you scrape off your skin when you scratch an itch. (Every cell of the body contains the complete genetic code for the whole body, fingers, toes, brain and all.) Probably the sample would be implanted in the nucleus of a human ovum. (There are plenty of those around; every female human produces and discards four or five hundred in her life.) It might be fertilized parthenogenetically (chemically or physically), or by artificial insemination using your own donated sperm. (If you are a woman, the easy second choice won't work, but the first remains a good possibility.) The embryo comes to term, either in a borrowed human uterus or in a testtube. It is "born" as an exact copy of what you were at birth, an identical twin. You allow it to grow up to roughly adult size—say, at least the age of puberty. And there it is, a living storehouse of spare parts for you. Your body would not reject the parts, because there is *no difference* between its parts and your own.

Of course, there is one problem. If you need a liver, say, and take it from your clone, then the clone doesn't have one. It would die. It might even refuse to give its liver to you.

It might refuse . . . if it had the power to make decisions. But suppose at the very beginning you inhibited the development of its brain. Suppose you kept it as a mindless, consciousnessless organism, perhaps supported on a heart-lung machine, all through its existence. You needn't be "cruel" to it. If you thought it might be suffering pain, or even discomfort, in spite of its mindless state, you could give it a nerve block, either surgically or by electrical stimulation, or by trickle-feeding it some sort of super-novocaine. You could keep that fresh meat in storage perhaps all your life. And if the cloned spare-parts supply showed signs of wearing out, you could always donate another scrap of tissue and start another clone.

Does this seem outlandish? It has been suggested, and not just by science fiction writers. Even more. Suppose you are a woman and you want a child, but don't particularly care for the trouble of childbearing. Your clone can have the child for you: conceive it through artificial insemination, bring it to term and deliver it. When it is born you can pick the baby up and take it home. In every biological sense it is your own child. No fuss, muss or bother . . . for you.

What it would be for the clone is, of course, something else again.

In this short essay I cannot hope to exhaust the spectrum of possibilities that lay between ourselves and the tricentennial. I have not said a word about intelligent machines. (But the best consensus of expert opinion is that we will have machines capable of scoring 150 or better on a standard IQ test before the end of this century—which is to say, machines as smart as a human genius, by the exact standards we use to measure human genius.) I have not touched on space exploration or colonization. (But Gerard K. O'Neill, at Princeton, has testified before congress on the feasibility of establishing space cities of a hundred thousand population or more at what is called the L5 point in the orbit of the moon.) I have only hinted at the bright hopes for new kinds of agriculture, and the almost certain disasters that is probably too late to avoid for some parts of the ecology. (Have we polluted at least part of our oceans past the point of no return? No one knows for sure, but some suspect it is so.)

So, at the end of this essay, *let me confess the truth about predicting the future: it cannot be done, except in the most limited of ways, with any exactness, because the act of prediction itself can change the course of events.* Predictions of excess population growth have turned out partly wrong, and part of the reason for that is that as people became aware of predictions they voluntarily limited the size of their families.

There is a more fundamental problem. As Dennis Gabor says, "You cannot predict the future. You can only invent it." It is not difficult to see what is *possible,* at least within limits. But to convert what is possible into what is real requires an act of will. We would not have landed a man on the Moon in the 1960s if it had not been for the fact that John F. Kennedy, shopping for a major event to mark what he hoped would be his second term in office, made the decision to allocate the resources to make it happen. The recipe for the future is one part inertia, one part opportunity and three parts decision. If enough individuals make the personal decision to conserve energy, we will conserve energy. If a large government makes the political decision to build Gerard O'Neill's space colonies, we will have a city of human beings in orbit around the earth.

To speak about the tricentennial of the United States at all requires a certain act of faith. How do we know there will *be* a United States in the year 2076 AD?

I don't mean to suggest any particular disaster that might befall us as a nation (although I could think of half a dozen real possibilities in five minutes, if asked). But on actuarial grounds alone, the life-span of world powers is not very reassuring. We tend to think of our American nation as brash, puppyish, adolescent; but actually our country is already rather old, as world

powers go. Look at the other significant nation-states in the world today. There are only two, really—the Soviet Union and mainland China—and we are twice as old as the other two combined already. Once a nation begins throwing its weight around on the world stage, its life-span is seldom much more than our present age. If you take into consideration the rapidly accelerating pace of events of all kinds, you may well conclude that only a miracle will keep our country alive and more or less unchanged through the tricentennial year.

I happen to believe in that miracle. Against the track odds, and bearing in mind all the reasons for pessimism in our particular case, I think the country will survive and, although I am sure it will pass through times of troubles, will be well and happy a hundred years from today.

I cannot give a reason for that, only faith. Faith not only in America, but in the essential educability and good will of human beings. The problems that confront us are not only grave but unprecedented. But, without exception, they are *man-made* problems. We have learned to cope very well with the world around us, less well with our own blunders and venalities.

But what problems we have created, we can surely also solve if we want to. All it takes is an act of will.

I think we—we Americans, and we members of the human race—have that will, and will exercise it.

Is America Decadent?

Peter L. Berger, Ph. D.

A few years after World War II a caustic European critic observed that America, skipping all intermediate stages, seemed to be moving directly from adolescence to senility. He mainly had American literature in mind, which at that time began to flourish an unprecedented efflorescence of gloom and pessimism. I don't know what this critic would say about America today (in fact, I've forgotten who he was), but I doubt whether he would feel constrained to revise his assessment. If the opposite of senility is youthful vigor, it is rather difficult to see contemporary America as vigorous. Indeed, as the United States celebrates its 200th anniversary, it is hard to resist the idea that here is a nation in a state of advanced decline.

A vigorous nation, one would say, is one that has confidence in itself and its future, working hard, willing to make sacrifices. These are characteristics that are not readily applied to America today. Every major institution of the society has undergone severe crises of confidence in the last decade, the most serious crisis being experienced by the political order on which the society was presumed to be resting. The cultural elite appears to be profoundly alienated from the traditional ethos of the society, and it is successfully diffusing this alienation through the educational and communications systems which it dominates. The business elite seems to be profoundly demoralized, while the politicians brandish mostly rhetoric that was exciting forty or fifty years ago. The birth rate is declining. Crime is dramatically rising. The "Protestant ethic" of hard work and productivity is being challenged by a sharply contrary ethic of self-realization and instant gratification. It is even questionable what proportion of the population would be willing to defend itself if attacked with armed force. Elements in the society that have a commitment to the old "vigorous" values (the military is one such element) find themselves, understandably, in a psychological stage of siege. The suggestion, then, that America may have reached an age of decadence is not taken out of thin air; it has depressingly empirical referents.

Nevertheless, the idea of decadence has its problems. For one thing, those employing it unavoidably select certain facts over others: Thus, someone arguing *against* the suggestion that America is decadent could cite the facts of the undiminished

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productivity of the economic system or of the presence in the society of large numbers of people apparently untouched by the crisis of confidence (people, say, who not only do not *read* the *New York Times,* but have never heard of it). For another thing, notions of societal decline are very often based on highly distorted recollections of a past in which, supposedly, life was so much better: Thus, there is a good chance that *every* generation in history saw its own period as one of decline, looking backward to an allegedly better past, be it in their own youth or in the age of parents or grandparents. More importantly, though, the idea of decadence comes out of a specific philosophy of history. This can be stated quite simply: The periods of human history are understood in analogy to the cycles of nature, as a sequence of birth, growth, decline and death: societies, then, can be categorized as "young", "mature" or "old", with appropriate traits in each phase. This view of history dates back to ancient Greece. It was classically stated by Thucydides when he claimed that it is "the nature of all things to grow as well as to decay". This view of history was sharply challenged by a long line of Christian thinkers, beginning with Augustine, who saw history not as a series of recurring cycles but as a line moving toward fulfilment in the Kingdom of God. The old view was taken up again by a number of modern thinkers, very importantly by Friedrich Nietzsche in the 19th century, and by Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee in the 20th.

This is obviously not the place to discuss the philosophical and theological issues involved. There is good reason, however, to be skeptical about the aforementioned view on the grounds of his torical and social science. Societies are *not* organisms, and to think of them in biological analogies can be very misleading. And, if one looks more closely at any historical period, the putative phases seem quite dubious. When does a society stop "growing" and attain the status of "maturity"? Just when does a society begin to be "old"? When can it be said to have "died"? In the development of modern historical scholarship these questions were endlessly debated in the case of ancient Rome—endlessly and, in the final analysis, fruitlessly. It always comes as a shock when one reads sources, which in one's own scheme of periodization fall in the "growth" or "young" phase of a particular society, only to come upon authors from that period who look back longingly to an earlier time when *they* thought that their society was "young". Depending on which contemporary sources one relies upon, the age of Julius Caesar, say, was one of undiminished youthful vigor, of mature power, or of beginning decadence. Nor is one better off when one looks to the "begin-

ning" or the "end" of Roman history. The origins of Rome are lost in myths—themselves of uncertain age. And there are ways of arguing that Rome never "ended" at all.

Sociological theory suggests that every human society is a highly precarious construction. It is an intricate network of assumptions and procedures which only acquires the appearance of stability, of permanence, because its members come to take it for granted. This taken-for-grantedness is the child of habit. Habits change, or are forced to change, sometimes abruptly. Anyone who has lived through periods of rapid social change (and that is many people in our own time) can testify to an experience that involves a retrospective insight: If institutions could collapse or be transformed so quickly, then the earlier perception of their stability must have been an illusion. This insight is essentially correct; it is good sociology. But then the whole organic analogy no longer makes sense: Societies do not grow, mature and decline. Always, even *in statu nascendi*, they are on the brink of dissolution. The wonder is not that a society "ends" at a given moment, but that it kept going for as long as it did.

All the same, the concept of decadence has a certain utility. It is capable of being abstracted from the aforementioned view of history and being used as a simply descriptive category, as follows: *It is possible to speak of decadence when the symbols that sustain a society lose plausibility. Put differently, a society may be said to be decadent when its underlying values become empty, hollowed out.* Only by having common symbols—language, cognitive structures, norms—can a group of human beings constitute a society. More specifically, a society is held together by an order of values, which provide individual meaning and collective moral guidance for its members. No amount of material power or wealth, by itself, can hold a society together. Only common symbols, values, can do that. But symbols and values cannot exist by themselves, apart from the consciousness of living human beings. That is, symbols and values must be *plausible:* People must consider them to refer to reality and to have moral authority. When this is no longer the case, when the societal symbolism is widely perceived to be unreal and morally non-binding, then the institutions thus symbolized become very fragile indeed. To be sure, the old symbols may still be used, as on ceremonial occasions, but they will not longer be taken seriously. They may even, quite literally, have "become a joke." And that, precisely, is decadence.

If decadence is understood in this way, rather than in terms of the organic analogy of a society getting "old", there is much in the present American situation that seems to fit the concept.

One may begin by looking at what Marxists call the "infrastructure" of the society—at its economic arrangements. To what extent the American economic system today can still be described as capitalism is perhaps debatable. We are approaching the point where one half of the gross national product is generated by government, and we have already reached the point where one half of the population receives some sort of government cheque every month, and those people who are not yet on this lucky list seem remarkably unreluctant to get on it. As to the sector of the economy that we call "private", it is heavily organized in gigantic corporations with an inveterate lust for monopoly control and permeated by an increasingly omnipresent complex of regulatory mechanisms operated by the government. This is not exactly the kind of economy that Adam Smith was writing about. Still, if one looks upon economic systems as ranging between a pole of untrammelled market forces and a pole of all-embracing political allocation, and if one calls the first pole capitalism and the second socialism, then certainly America is closer to the first than to the second. In this relative sense, especially as compared with most of the rest of the contemporary world, America is still a bastion of capitalism.

Yet there has been a marked decline in the esteem in which capitalism is held by the American people, or at least by large segments of the latter. There is a widespread antagonism to the businessman and all he represents. Profit has become a dirty word to many. Corporations are widely perceived as near criminal, or outrightly criminal conspiracies, bent upon cheating the public, destroying the environment and spreading tyranny abroad. Now, let it be quickly said that, of course, there is a measure of reality in these negative perceptions. Nor is this something new: American business has been guilty of quite stupendous misdeeds in the past. What has changed from earlier periods of American history is that many now perceive these misdeeds as constituting the very essence of the capitalist system, while at the same time the empirical achievements of the system are overlooked with determination. These achievements are stupendous too: The most productive economy in the history of mankind. An unparallelled generation of wealth, which has roughly *doubled* the standard of living of Americans, *including* those in the lower strata of the population, *every generation* since the turn of the century. A highly equitable distribution of this wealth, if the standard of comparison is other empirical societies rather than an abstract ideal of equality. The coexistence of this measure of economic productivity with political institutions fostering individual freedom.

Nearly all Americans benefit from this economic system every

day of their lives. Curiously, the greatest disaffection from the system is found today among its most pampered beneficiaries in the upper middle class. This is decadent. Even more so is the remarkable inability of the business class to defend itself against its adversaries. Sometimes these days it seems as if even the capitalists have lost their belief in capitalism.

Closely related to this is the "hollowing out" of broader cultural symbols. Prominent among these are the values commonly called (since the work of Max Weber) the "Protestant ethic". It is precisely this ethic (as Weber showed) that has been very instrumental in bringing about modern capitalism, especially in America. It fostered virtues such as hard work, saving, discipline, individual self-reliance and the urge toward achievement. Now, there is a long tradition in western countries that has stood in opposition to this value system, which it denigrated as "bourgeois culture". This tradition (Lionel Trilling called it the "adversary culture") has been particularly strong in the intellectual elite, which prided itself on having values supposedly more civilized and more humane than those of the bourgeoisie. The latter was perceived as a money-grubbing group devoid of an understanding of the higher values of culture. Sinclair Lewis has, as it were, codified the American version of this negative perception in his figure of Babbitt; H.L. Mencken coined the term "booboiserie" for the class thus denigrated. To an extent, then, there is nothing new in all of this. What has happened since World War II, however, is that much larger numbers of people have come to consider themselves part of the cultural elite—and thus opposed to "bourgeois culture". This, of course, is the result of the much greater accessibility of college education, also of the elite influences diffused more widely than ever before through the mass media of communication.

In consequence, the "Protestant ethic" has been under massive assault in recent years, with the assault reaching a certain crescendo in the late 1960s. The value of hard work is put down as dehumanizing, even pathological. Saving is but another aspect of "delayed gratification", *ipso facto* frustrating and destructive of the creative impulse. Discipline is identified with "repression". Against these old values, a new, thoroughly hedonistic ethic is propagated. The healthy life is one that is lived "now", dedicated to the unrestrained expression of self. Individualism too has come under attack, especially in its competitive aspect, and achievement is now widely perceived as a capitulation to the "rat race". This broadside attack on the values of the middle class come to a climax, of course, in the so-called counter-culture. It would be an error, though, to see it

as being limited to the latter. Contrary to the great expectations of a few years ago, the counter-culture has become a marginal phenomenon: America as a whole did not "green". Still, it has become "greener". Indeed, part of the reason that the assault on "Middle America" has become more quiet is that it has already been so successful. The old values, the old morality, are very much on the defensive today. People who continue to live by the "Protestant ethic", in many places today, are more than a little ashamed of their own supposed "backward" or "uptight" way of life.

Value change, of course, is not necessarily a sign of decadence. One could even argue that such change is conducive to the vitality and the survival capacity of a society. But it is the specific character of the change that must be looked at. Put simply, what is changing are those values upon which the productivity of the society depends. Without readiness for work, discipline and a measure, at least, of self-denial, no society can look forward to much of a future.

But the most alarming erosion of plausibility has been taking place in the political sphere. The American nation is unusual in that it has been, from the beginning, based explicitly on a specific political creed, which was incorporated in the documents (most notably, of course, the constitution) emerging from the struggle for national independence. During the last decade this creed has undergone the severest shocks. The racial crisis, the Vietnam war and Watergate mark the stages of this erosion, but is is by no means clear that there are not more stages ahead. No political order can survive many such shocks, least of all a democratic one. When all is said and done, a political order can rest on only two foundations—consensus and coercion: as consensus wanes, reliance on coercion increases, must increase. Or, of course, the political order starts to fall apart. It is sobering to recall that the two greatest revolutions of modern times, the French and the Russian, were each preceded by scandals that led important segments of the people to conclude that there was ineradicable corruption at the very heart of power—the affair of the queen's necklace in France and the Rasputin affair in Russia. The rhetoric and the ceremonialism of the political order can then go on for a while longer, but it has become "empty", devoid of inner meaning or conviction. It would be hard to assess how far the erosion of American political symbols has gone in the same direction. There can be no question but that it has gone a long way from the early 1960s, when, for instance, President Kennedy could still inaugurate his administration with an unambiguous and virtually unchallenged appeal to the virtues of patriotism and democracy.

All these phenomena have multiple causes, all of which, though, are ultimately related to the process of modernization. A modern society, by its very nature, imposes strains on its symbol system. The reasons for this cannot be pursued here; suffice it to say that there is nothing mysterious about this, but that the explanation must be sought in the empirically available character of modern institutions. American society relates to modernization in a very special way. Talcott Parsons has called America the "lead society". This is by no means a statement of national pride, not even a positive value judgment. It simply means that a number of modernizing processes have gone further in America than anywhere else. Among these are social mobility, pluralism, cultural integration through mass communications and rapidly rising living standards. It is not surprising, in that case, that the strains brought on by modernization should have a particular virulence in America. One other factor should at least be mentioned here. American society has always given a very prominent place to religion and religious institutions. Only recently has America come to feel the impact of an overt secularization (which in other western countries has been a concomitant of modernization for a much longer time). It is very likely that this fact is closely related to the crisis in the plausibility of symbols and values. Religion, more than anything else, provides the cement of belief holding a society together; if this cement is suddenly softened, the effects on the societal edifice can be dramatic.

It is important to recall in this connection that America is a very big and complex country. It is dangerous, therefore, to generalize about it. In the matter under discussion here, there are great differences between the metropolitan areas and the rest of the country, as also between various larger regions. Thus the "Protestant ethic" may still be very much alive in some places while it is in full disarray in others, and so on down the line with the other developments discussed above. Put differently, while some of America may indeed be called decadent, other parts of the country and of the population may still be relatively unaffected. Caution in interpretation, then, is very much indicated. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt about the reality of the aforementioned erosion process, and it is probable that the process has not yet reached its widest spread or its greatest intensity.

What of the future? If decadence cannot be understood as a natural phase in the organic cycle of human societies, then there is nothing inevitable about it, especially not in the short run (in the long run, one could argue, all historical constructions come apart—not because they are organic entities, but

because of the contingencies of human life). Decadence in any particular place or time is due to particular casual developments which, in principle, are reversible: Just as symbols and values can become "empty", so can they once more be "filled" with meaning.

Nobody can foretell the future, and the social scientist is no exception. What the latter can do, however, it to make certain "if . . . then" statements. It can be said with some assurance that if the erosion processes described in this paper continue for much longer or increase in their intensity, then American society will find itself in a very severe crisis indeed. On the institutional level, especially in the economy and the political order, there would then be increasingly pervasive disintegrations, possibly of cataclysmic proportions. The likelihood of this is only reinforced by the world position of the United States: A further decline in American power would have far-reaching international repercussions, which in turn would act back upon the internal American situation. To escape from this crisis, there is always the possibility of the shift from consensus to coercion. The instrument of such a shift, under modern conditions, is invariably the nation-state. What happens then is that the tottering symbol system is held up by government fiat and, wherever necessary, by the application of government force. It hardly needs saying that such an eventuality would spell the end of democracy.

There remains the possibility of a revival, a regeneration of the beliefs and values upon which American society was originally built. It is the *only* possibility worth an investment of hope. It cannot be brought about by government fiat—not even in a bicentennial year. Rather, it must come from many institutional sources, from movements of ideas and emotion among broad segments of the American people. It is likely to take political forms, though its sources will also have to be nonpolitical. In view of American history and the underlying traits of American society, it is also likely that the religious institutions would have to play an important role in such a revival.

CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY A.D.

Wilford E. Smith, Ph.D.

INTRODUCTION

This paper is limited to a consideration of what the religious condition of America will be in the year 2000 as it will relate to political power. There are several possible relations which may prevail in twenty-four years, the three most extreme being:

1. Official abolition or control of religion by an all powerful state (as in Russia)
2. Complete control of the state by religion (as in Europe and elsewhere in the past)
3. The withering away of both church and state so that men would live in uncoerced, idyllic brotherhood (the Communist dream)

In an explosive atomic age, it cannot be said that these extreme possibilities are unreal, but the odds against them are too great for serious consideration in this paper. Other more probable possibilities are that:

1. Levels of freedom and tolerance will continue to grow and encourage pluralism of religion and nonreligion privately supported but protected by sovereign law.
2. Ecumenical brotherhood tolerant of diversity of religious interpretation will unite Americans in a civilized society giving little heed to fundamentalistic "narrowness." "Civil religion" will play a large role.
3. State support of "major faiths," or one major religion, and tolerant protection of others, as long seen in several European countries, will become the norm.
4. The state will provide both support and protection for all religions and see that none receives unfair advantage over others.
5. Traditional religion will gradually fade away in a secularized society where philosophy or civil religion will prevail tolerating pockets of vestigial religion as small groups of "fundamentalists" hold out against secularism.

Each of these possibilities (or combinations of them) seems realistic, but trends in public opinion and in legal decisions suggest that the first, second, or fourth is most likely to prevail. Ten years ago the first would seem to be ascendant, but recent movements toward governmental support of religion suggest that the fourth may yet prevail. Pluralistic developments could evolve to the second alternative, but desire for personal freedom and belief in equal rights are too highly prized, and ethnocentrism is too strong to permit either this alternative, or

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the third, to materialize. Among social scientists the fifth alternative might receive most support, but one who believes in the reality of God and eternal gospel principles has difficulty with this view which seems implicitely to argue that both God and religion are man made and will fade away as men become educated. Even the religious person will have to face the possibility of wholesale apostacy, however, which could lead to this eventuality.

FREEDOM, CONSCIENCE, AND SOVEREIGNTY

A popular theory in contemporary sociology holds that conflict is the dominant characteristic of human society. Man is a creature who struggles against other men, other creatures, and the elements in his efforts to fulfill his wants. Status and the power that goes with it are not equally available to all, and there is not enough for everyone to have all he would like. Status and power must be won, and persons and groups with the greatest ability to achieve will beat others to them and will then maintain them only so long as they are strong enough to do so. Social organization (including economic, political and religious organization) is a means of solidifying the status of power holders and of regulating struggles for power so that they do not become too costly. But social organization is seldom strong enough to prevent deviance, or even insurrection, for long, for there is always a "circulation of the elites" whereby power holders who have grown flabby are replaced in turn by more energetic ones despite the built in advantage incumbants enjoy.

"Order theories" in sociology, on the other hand, contend that norms and social controls are not always established by conflict but may also be the product of long usage by cooperating and responsible people. Order theorists agree that all societies will have deviance but that the deviance will serve to clarify the norms, and its punishment will justify the righteousness of conformers and thus make virtue more rewarding.

Many philosophers and theologians contend that these sociological theories fail to give due credit to the innate conscience of men, that there has been an endless human struggle to rise above social controls and stagnant norms to a level of individual integrity governed by fully developed conscience which lifts a person above cultural bonds or conflicts and makes him a free, responsible, and creative soul. People with this philosophical orientation see a gradual rise of mankind from ages of bondage to superstition, fear, and ignorance to a new age of freedom and justice.

Gustavus Myers traces some of the threads of conflict and ethnocentism in American history and shows that persecution

of unpopular peoples is as old as history, but he argues that we may be headed toward an era of tolerance and respect for others. [1]

He declares,

> . . . it is with conditions in England that we are concerned, since those formed the background of the American colonists in general . . . . Inasmuch as for centuries the course of the English governmental actions was a series of proscriptions and persecutions, populations grew up under these familiar processes. They accepted them all the more because the clergy told them that it was the will of God to exterminate the creatures of the Devil.[2]
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> * * *
>
> the American Revolution ushered in some notable changes, one of which was to sunder the power of the theocratic elements, the other to diminish the spirit of bigotry cohering in previous codes of laws. (p. 100)

As men of good will seek enlightenment, they seem to rise above bigotry, but they still realize that different people (even the intelligent, learned, and honest) have different commitments and unequal capacities which make complete equality of freedom impossible. Francis Agnew is one of many contemporary scholars who realize that the concept of complete freedom can only be abstraction:

> (Freedom) may be defined as the absence of necessity, coercion, or constraint in the choice of action. Put colloquially, it is "the right to do as one chooses" restricted only by the limits posed by the human condition. . . . But once this has been said, it must be added immediately that, conceived as an approach to life, this concept of freedom is an abstraction, a chimera, a phantasy. Any realistic view of freedom, even in a purely secular sense, involves quite necessarily the foregoing of an absolute freedom of choice.[3]

Agnew notes, however, that despite its abstract nature man has always struggled to believe that freedom could be attained:

> . . . Determinism, whether arrived at from consideration of the nature of God (who, as the scholastics said, must cause everything not only in its essence but also in its mode) or from consideration of the inexorable laws of nature seems to block the possibility of human freedom. From the dilemma which it poses for this question, there is no logical egress. And yet, determinism has generally been regarded as an aberration on the Western philosophical scene. Man experiences freedom within himself, and Western thought, both religious and secular, has continued at tremendous cost to insist that man is free. So constant a tradition asserted against so formidable a difficulty indicates beyond a doubt the importance of the phenomenon involved. (p. 360).
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> . . . but what is vastly more important, the good which can be achieved

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[1] Myers, Gustavus, *History of Bigotry in the United States* (New York: Random House, 1943).

[2] *Ibid.*, p.7.

[3] Agnew, Francis, "Christian Freedom—A New Testament Reflection," *The American Ecclesiastical Review*, Vol. 169, No. 6 (June 1975), p. 370.

in society is possible only with the development of structures which place a responsible restriction upon absolute freedom. (pp. 370, 371).

* * *

Such restraint can be founding in individual self-control based on awareness of the interdependence of men and the limitations of individual power, or it can be imposed by external social, political, or religious controls. If it is imposed from without, Christian idealism becomes a farce, for the Christian concept of freedom must be "The absence of necessity, coercion, or restraint relative to the living of the gospel ideal." (Agnew, p. 371)

Milton Konvitz makes a compelling plea for the enthronement of conscience rather than external compulsion in human expression.[4] He believes that religion grows out of conscience, and that man must be true to himself even if it means confrontation with sovereign force or religious edict. His argument is compelling in its pleas for man to stand for what he believes and throw off the shackles of external restraint, for to do otherwise is to forfeit dignity.

Konvitz declares, however, that we live in changing and confused times:

> . . . The limits on the legitimate powers of government are not frozen. Lines are drawn, but they are constantly being redrawn, and no one can foretell where the line will be in the next decade or even in the next year.
>
> . . . Our views about the very nature of religion, like our views of the state, have undergone drastic changes, and the end of this process is not in sight. We no longer know definitely the things that are Caesar's and the things that are God's. (p. viii)

He goes on to argue that modern enlightenment is opening the way for man to question old ways and to stand boldly on his own feet:

> . . . And this questioning mood spares no one and nothing. It refuses to exempt God and religion. The "honest to god" debate started by the Bishop of Woolwich, and the "death of God" debate, and the "secular city" debate, and the debate in Vatican Council II—all are part of the same phenomenon: nothing, no institution, no one, and no belief is too sacred to be questioned. (p. 4)
>
> . . . Now, perhaps for the first time in history, the law as an institution is itself being critically, openly, defiantly challenged. (p. 5)
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> * * *
>
> The Nuremberg trials established the principle in international law that the defense of having acted pursuant to orders of the government or a superior officer does not absolve a defendant from responsibility. (p. 99)

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1948, Article 1, says,

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[4] Konvitz, Milton R., *Religious Liberty and Conscience* (New York: Viking Press, 1969).

> All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. (p. 100)

Citing Job, "Behold, he will slay me; yet I will defend my ways to His face" (Job 13:15), and the fact that Abraham dared question God about the justice of destroying Sodom, Konvitz concludes that,

> Through conscience man transcends the state and its laws and passes judgment on them. But even more, through conscience man transcends even his religion, and still more, dares to judge even God himself. (p. 103)
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> * * *
>
> Religion may enhance or degrade man; it all depends on what it is. But without conscience, man has no dignity; without it, man is not man.
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> * * *
>
> To protect religion fully, it is necessary to protect conscience, on which it is based and without which it could not long exist. One day the Supreme Court will feel itself compelled to recognize this fact and give it constitutional dignity. (p. 104)

TRENDS IN GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL

It appears that political authority is inevitable in a stable society, and the world trend is toward ever growing governmental control in the lives of men. Uncontrolled freedom of enterprise in commerce, religion, education, and even marriage has led to exploitation and oppression. So men turn to government, over which by the power to vote they feel that they have some control, for protection and assistance. The consequence is ever greater governmental controls, and costs. *Newsweek*, December 15, 1975, focused on the growing power, and threat, of big government playing its paternalistic role which has created a "revolution of rising entitlements" (quoting Daniel Bell) and shifted focus from the time-honored American belief in the right of all to pursue equal opportunity to a belief in the pursuit of equal outcomes and advantages as practically absolute rights of citizenship to the point that the stability of American society is threatened (p. 37). Government in America in 1975 employed 14.6 billion people and spent $523.2 billion, accounting for 37% of the gross national product, compared to 12% in 1929, and there is little likelihood that government growth is about to end. The voting public continue to demand big government.

As government assumes greater dominance in the lives of men, does it threaten freedom of religion? Trends in several areas where the state has exercised sovereign power will help to clarify the picture:

1. Medicine

The Academy Award winning movie of 1975, "One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest," is an open warning about governmental control of the rights of the mentally ill. This warning is not new.[5] The U.S. District Court in New York spelled out the governmental view in its Winters vs. Miller verdict on November 21, 1969:

> Freedom of religious belief is absolute.... However, the freedom to act, even when the action is in accord with one's religious convictions, is not totally free from legislative restrictions.... When there are strong interests of the State other than the welfare of the patient alone, the patient's religious objections may be ignored when treatment is necessary.... A limitation of religious practices is proper when there is a compelling public interest which conflicts with the individual's private religious interest.[6]

2. Conscientious Objection to Military Participation

There have been dozens of court cases dealing with conscientious objection to war. The Supreme Court has spelled out three requirements for CO status which have become standardized in the courts:

a. The claimant must show that he conscientiously objects to war in any form. (Gillett vs. United States, 401 U.S. 437).
b. He must show that his opposition is based on religious training and belief, as that has been construed by the Supreme Court (United States vs. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163; Welsh vs. United States, 398 U.S. 333).
c. He must show that his objection is sincere (Witmer vs. United States, 348 U.S. 375).

Respect for conscience has thus received strong support in judicial arbitration, whether the petitioner is religious or an atheist. How far this tolerance would go if national survival were at stake cannot be said at present. However, even now the court requires conscience to coincide with governmental guidelines. Objection to a given war, regardless of how logical or sincere, has not been recognized.

3. State Control of Private Schools

Many court cases have spelled out the state's relationship to private schools, but there are still areas of dissent and confusion, and decisions vary with the pressures of the times.

The 1925 Society of Sisters and Hill Military Academy cases were a monumental negation of a state's right to control private education.[7]

In a lapse into a less lenient mood, on June 3, 1940 the U.S.

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[5] Thomas Szasz, "Medicine and the State: The First Amendment Violated," *The Humanist*, March/April 1973, pp. 4–9.

[6] 306 F. Supp. 1158 (New York).

[7] *American Law Reports, Annotated*, Vol. 39, pp. 473–474 (1925).

Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision ruled that, despite their religious beliefs, Lillian and William Gobitis, aged 12 and 10, would have to pledge allegiance to the American flag. But on June 14, 1943 the Supreme Court reversed this Gobitis ruling in the Barnette case.

In 1947 the Supreme Court (Everson vs. Ewing, 330 U.S.) ruled that public school districts may provide transportation for parochial school pupils, and on April 28, 1952 it ruled that New York could release public school pupils for religious education off the school property if it involved no coercion nor cost to the state.[8]

Four years earlier, however, the Supreme Court had ruled that allowing teachers of religion to enter the public schools to teach was illegal, saying:

> Separation means separation, not something else. . . . In no activity of the state is it more vital to keep out divisive forces than in the schools, . . ." (McCollum vs. Board of Education).

Possibly more momentous than these rulings was the January 8, 1971 ruling of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin (upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court) that Amish children do not have to attend public high schools.[9]

On July 8, 1958 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that, " . . . government . . . , is without power to prescribe by law any particular form of prayer . . ." (the Regents' Prayer Case), and in 1963 the Murray and Schemmp cases it outlawed Bible reading and religious recitations in public schools (374 U. S. 203).

In 1963, Congress passed the Higher Education Facilities Act which provides *grants* to church related colleges to subsidize *secular* functions. This was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1971 (Tilton vs. Richardson, No. 153 U.S. Supreme Court). But in 1970 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the 1969 Rhode Island "Salary Supplement Act" which would have subsidized public teachers teaching secular subjects in parochial schools and the 1968 Pennsylvania "Non—public Elementary and Secondary Act" which authorized the purchasing of "secular educational services" from nonpublic schools. The Court declared that these acts invited excessive entanglement of government and religion. However, the 1965 (and later amended) Elementary and Secondary Education Act passed by Congress provides subsidies for pupils in private schools on the grounds that such aid is for persons and not for schools. The U.S. Supreme Court

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[8] Zorach and Gluck vs. Clawson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).

[9] The Ecclesiastical Court Digest, Vol. 9, No. 5 (May 1971), p. 5. State vs. Yoder, 182 N.W. 539 (Wisconsin) and Wisconsin vs. Yoder 406 U.S. 205 (1972).

upheld this act in 1968 (Board vs. Allen, 392, U.S. 236; see also Meek vs. Pittinger 95 S. Ct. 1753, May 19, 1975).

The U.S. District Court of Maryland (Rosemer vs. Board of Public Works, October 16, 1974) summarized the general stand of the U.S. Supreme Court by listing a three part test which has become standarized:

a. The statute must have a secular legislative purpose.
b. Its primary effect must be to neither advance nor inhibit religion.
c. It must not foster an excessive governmental entanglement with religion.

In competition with state supported public schools, parochial schools have been losing ground rapidly since 1960,[10] and government increasingly imposes controls on private schools in the forms of grants and other aid programs only if the schools involved will function as HEW guidelines require.[11] Government influences continue to grow despite popular distrust of politicians. When asked in two national polls how much of the time they thought they could trust the government in Washington, the people sampled replied as follows:[12]

	1964	*1974*
Always	14%	2%
Most of the time	62%	30%
Some of the time	22%	64%
Don't know	2%	4%

PLURALISTIC MORAL AND RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERICA

The rights of Americans to believe what they please and for churches and opponents of churches to teach what they please have become strongly established. The courts have rejected some practices such as polygamy (Mormons) and the use of drugs in religious ceremonies (Timothy Leary's LSD and the Church of the Awakening's peyote), but they continue to permit Indians to use peyote, and they hesitate to impose their own definition of religion on others.

The 1972 Theriault decision (339 F. Supp. 375, U. S. District Court for Northern Georgia) reaffirmed even a prisoner's right to freedom of religion, off beat though that religion might be, as long as it did not infringe on the rights of others:

> . . . . This court is not unmindful of the very real possibility that

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[10] Rosten, Leo (Ed.), *Religions of America* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975), p. 514.
[11] "That Suffocating Federal Help," *Time*, December 8, 1975, p. 44.
[12] *Newsweek*, December 15, 1975, p. 44.

> petitioners are still engaged in a game and attempting to perpetrate a colossal fraud upon both this court and the federal prison system. Nevertheless with all due respect to respondents, the court cannot declare petitioners' religion illegitimate. (p. 383)

Citing this case, the U.S. District S.D. Court of Iowa D.C. agreed that Theriault's Church of the New Song (*Eclat*) qualified as a religion (Remness vs. Brewer, July 24, 1973), but on March 18, 1975 the U.S. District Court W.D. of Texas declared that the masquerade must halt, ". . . the unmistakeable stench of the skunk is found emanating from that which petitioner has declared a rose (Theriault vs. Silber)." In other cases prisoners have been denied certain use of prison facilities because of the need to protect the general welfare (Satanic Religion, Kennedy vs. Meacham, October 20, 1974, U. S. District Court D., Wyoming).

On June 30, 1972, after many decades of compulsory chapel attendance in the military academies, the U.S. Court of Appeals at Washington, D.C., ruled such practice unconstitutional (later upheld by the Supreme Court) partly because it did not fully respect religious pluralism in the country and partly because it involved state support of religion.

The Supreme Court has also ruled that American moral standards are so diverse that no central body can provide a national standard definition of pornography (Miller vs. California, June 21, 1973), declaring that henceforth "obscenity is to be determined by applying 'contemporary community standards.' "

The courts in Idaho, Texas, Montana, and New York have also ruled in the last three years that private organizations may enforce their own moral standards, reject nonmembers' requests for accommodations, claim exemption from requirements of the Fair Employment Practices Act, and adhere to their own religious beliefs. The U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, on September 15, 1972, upheld the right of a Catholic priest, who had been fired for publicly criticizing the policies of the state hospital in which he was employed as a chaplain, to be reinstated in his job. (Incidentally, the question of the state's employing a chaplain was not even considered.)

Reluctance of the courts to interfere with religion and to recognize its many manifestations was also shown in the 1971 U.S. vs. Article or Device case. The use of "E—meters" by the Church of Scientology (organized in 1955) was ruled to be a fraud in counseling therapy, but the court would not rule against their being used for religious purposes.[13]

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[13] 333 F. Supp. 357, U.S. District Court, District of Columbia, July 30, 1971.

McLoughlin has observed that amidst the "decadence" of some of America's churches and some of her religious beliefs a "third-force," consisting of the so-called "fundamentalist" churches whose membership has increased 500 to 700 percent over the past twenty years, is bringing new religious vitality to the scene (while the more "traditional" churches have increased only 75 to 90 percent).[14] He adds, ". . . I think it could be said that the third-force is no longer solidly Protestant, but a pluralistic combination of Catholics, Protestants, and Jews, all of whom are now part of the pietistic American culture system."[15]

Berger has declared that the churches may become captive institutions submerged in a culture religion identified with the "American Way of Life," the public schools being the agency in which this politically established "culture religion" is taught.[16] Langdon Gilkey argues that contemporary Protestant theology, if it is not dominated by "civil religion," has many secular roots, and that Protestantism is evolving toward secularism.[17]

Because education tends to debunk the myths on which religion feeds, as O'Dea appears to see it, "Genuine religious experience issuing in authentic faith and wholeness of spirit and combining with contemporary relevance has become increasingly rare and difficult. Consequently, this age lacks relevant religious exemplars." [18] He adds, "In a world that cries out for authentic transcendence and genuine community, the trumpets of conventional religiosity give forth sounds of uncertainty," and, "Some men avoid the contemporary religious crisis by relying upon an enlightened and sophisticated common sense . . . , they leave questioning to those whom they consider esoteric and impractical . . . . Other men stay within the safe confines of academic disciplines and professional pursuits." [19]

Marty expresses similar concern for man's too often futile search for spiritual meaning in pluralistic and secular America.[20] Novak joins the chorus:

> . . . . Alasdair MacIntyre opened his review of *Honest to God* with one memorable sentence, "What is striking about Dr. Robinson's book is first and foremost that he is an atheist," and closed it with another,

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[14] William G. McLoughlin, "Is There A Third Force in Christendom?" *Daedalus*, Vol. 96, No. 1, Winter, 1967, p. 45.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 51.

[16] Berger, Peter L., *The Noise of Solemn Assemblies* (Garden City, N.Y., 1961).

[17] Langdon Gilkey, "Social and Intellectual Sources of Contemporary Protestant Theology in America," *Daedalus*, Vol. 96, No. 1 (Winter, 1967), pp. 69–98.

[18] Thomas F. O'Dea, "The Crisis of the Contemporary Religious Consciousness," *Daedalus*, Vol. 96, No. 1 (Winter, 1967), p. 129.

[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 131–132.

[20] Martin E. Marty, "The Spirit's Holy Errand: The Search for Spiritual Style in Secular America," *Daedalus*, Vol. 96, No. 1, p. 99.

"The creed of the English is that there is no God and that it is wise to pray to him from time to time." [21]

Novak concludes that Christianity has probably reached the end of the line.[22] The Seeger and Welsh conscientious objection to war decisions based on sincere belief but unrelated to religion are further evidence of growing secularism, as the 1961 rejection of Maryland's constitutional requirement that all political office holders believe in God (Torasco vs. Watkins, 367 U.S.) is a reaffirmation of the separation of church and state.

Homosexuality is becoming acceptable in some religious circles as are divorce and abortion. The Methodist Church has quietly done away with its long standing requirement that its ministers vow to refrain from alcohol, tobacco, and coffee. The Presbyterian Church has relaxed its condemnation of premarital sexual intercourse despite the cry of some members that "We *should* have high standards to strive for; the church *ought* to be in the high-standards business just as much as in the forgiveness and healing business." [23]

A 1971 Gallup poll of 845 priests concerning their view on the Catholic ban on artificial birth control revealed a great difference according to age, but of even the most orthodox group nearly one-third disagreed with the church's stand: [24]

	Agree	Disagree	No Opinion
All priests	52%	41%	7%
39 and under	27%	67%	9%
40 and over	67%	28%	5%

An international mail poll of ministers in 1968 (Gallup) showed, however, that Americans were most likely to believe in a personal God (98%). The lowest level of belief was found in Sweden (60%).[25] The breakdown in belief in God for the three so-called major faiths in a 1971 survey of 2,517 American clergymen showed: [26]

	Believe in a Personal God	Believe in a Vital Force	Not sure, or no belief
Protestant	93%	7%	1%
Catholic	99%	1%	
Rabbis	55%	43%	4%

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[21] Michael Novak, "Christianity: Renewed or Slowly Abandoned?" *Daedalus*, *op. cit.*, p. 239.
[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 246–247.
[23] Jack Star, "The Presbyterian Debate over Sex," *Look*, Vol. 34, No. 16 (August 11, 1970), p. 54.
[24] Leo Rosten, *op. cit.*, p. 371.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 339.
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 339f.

In an age of pluralism, Stark and Glock cite the growing ecumenical movement as something of a denial of the importance of once vital beliefs which led to the development of each denomination.[27] The key, they say, to dying Christianity is the demise of belief in the core of Christian faith, "Christ crucified, risen, coming again." [28]

It may be that the flourishing growth of activity in the so-called "fundamentalist" churches in the 1960s and 1970s and the decline in the growth of "major" churches supports the Glock and Stark observations. It may be that the broadmindedness of educated ministers who see shades of gray instead of just whites and blacks is losing the support and confidence of people who are looking for pillars of security in troubled times, as E. M. Adams put it:

> In the area of religion, politics, morals, and all other basic value issues, we feel that everyone is not only entitled to his opinion, but that everyone's opinion is just as good as anyone else's, which is to admit that, as far as truth is concerned, no one's is worth anything. Where we hold that there is the possibility of truth, we do not believe that everyone is entitled to his opinion. While tolerance may prevent conflict, it may be the product of indifference, of the conviction that nothing really matters, that everything goes, that everything is permitted. Peace won through tolerance at the price of a world-view would be a poor bargain. [29]

Holders of such a view fear the general trend toward liberalism in America (spearheaded by increasing levels of education) which Clyde Parker has documented. He cites studies which suggest that only about half of our American college students believe in a personal God and much less than half believe in a physical resurrection, though there are great variations from denomination to denomination. He concludes that, "there is little evidence to cause one to believe that religious belief is an important force motivating behavior of college students, and there is some evidence to indicate that other personality characteristics could account for the behavioral differences between highly religious and nonreligious students." [30] Hirschi and Stark have similarly concluded that, "The Church is irrelevant to delinquency . . ." [31] Changes continue, espe-

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[27] Rodney Stark and Charles Y. Glock, "Will Ethics Be the Death of Christianity?" *Trans-action*, June 1968, p. 7.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

[29] E. M. Adams, "A Changing America, Morale and Morality," *Vital Speeches of the Day* (This speech was given at the Thirteenth Annual Spotlight on Women, Extension Division, University of North Carolina, March 1968), p. 590.

[30] Clyde A. Parker, "Changes in Religious Beliefs of College Students," in *Research in Religious Development*, Edited by Merton P. Strommen (New York: Hawthorne Books, Inc., 1971), p. 768.

[31] Travis Hirschi and Rodney Stark, "Hellfire and Delinquency," *Social Problems* 17 (Fall, 1969), pp. 202–213.

cially in the "sexual revolution," but here again there have been great denominational differences.[32]

CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS

The data assembled in this paper give evidence of a lively concern for the freedom of personal conscience at the same time they show the imperious nature of law in a sovereign country. Court cases in large number preserve individual freedom of belief and of action, but they also show the reality of political control. The grooming of servicemen and policemen may be regulated in the name of discipline, people may be forced to accept medical treatment to which they conscientiously object, for their minor children at least, in the name of public welfare, and state controls are becoming larger in employment practices, housing, health, education, welfare, and business competition.

Nevertheless, within limits of court defined public and personal safety, religious expression remains free in America. Although the sovereign state continues to increase its influence and control in more and more areas of human life, it continues to recognize and adhere to the requirements of the First Amendment. If the time comes when the government takes over religion, it will be because the churches have invited it into the tent, so to speak, by accepting piecemeal grants and subsidies (and their inevitable controls). This has begun to happen in increasing aid to private schools. It could easily become more strongly entrenched by the year 2000 A.D.

Levels of personal freedom and tolerance probably will continue to grow, and privately supported pluralistic religion, protected by sovereign law, probably will prevail despite increasing state aid and control in a heavily secularistic twenty-first century.

[32] see *Dialogue*, Summer Issue, 1976.

The Future of Human Relations in the United States

Herbert O. Edwards, Ph.D.

There are some things which involve almost as much risk as attempting to project future possibilities—but not too many. Two, however, which run an almost neck-and-neck second, are: 1) interpreting the past; and 2) trying to assess the present.

Although I am not unaware of the terrible risks attendant upon the effort, I will attempt to discuss the future of human relations in the United States. Clearly the most significant and most problematic area of human relations in this country, is predicated upon the concept of race, namely, the black—white relations.

We will begin with a summary descriptive statement of where we have been in racial human relations in this country in the past. Secondly, we will discuss where we are now as one black person reads the situation. Thirdly, we will project some goals for the future which we feel eventuate out of the promise that America claims to be, and some expectations given our past and present responses to conflictual situations growing out of black and white responses to human relationships.

A further introductory word seems in order. The proclaimed separation of church and state in American history must not believe the fact that church and state, or organized religion and political institutions at every level and in every area, have cooperated and conspired in the defining of limited areas of participation in American life by black people. That being the case, it is clear that religious spokesmen, wherever situated, have a peculiar responsibility for and contribution to make toward the clarification of those values which ought to inform our individual and group responses to other persons and groups. This should not surprise us since religious motivations have been a continuing factor in the course of American life.

However often religion has been shunted to the side in the desire to secularize American life, however much religion has been reduced to being a "handmaiden" or "kept woman" of forces of status quo oppression, it is still significant that it was a religious leader (Martin L. King, Jr.) who forced America again to one of its periodic reassessments of the relationship between proclaimed goals and ideals and its institutional and group practices in human relations.

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In this bicentennial year we are often reminded of the glorious feats of the Founding Fathers. We are often reminded to follow their examples, to be possessed of the courage of our convictions as were the early leaders of the country. No one can deny that the early leaders of the country were men of courage and determination. In many ways they left indelible impressions and footprints on the sands of our historical time. They did indeed help to give shape and character to the continuing ambivalence toward the black presence in this country.

At first glance it might appear that the Founding Fathers really had undergone some kind of transformation in their thinking when we see them move from the clear and universal language of the Declaration of Independence to the adoption of the 3/5 Compromise in the Constitution.

The Declaration boldly stated:

> "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness . . .[1]

These words seem to give voice to Thomas Jefferson's famous vow of enmity toward every tyranny over the mind of man.

However, in Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution, we see the particularized application of these self evident, universal truths.

> "Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons.[2]

However, the "problem" which occasioned the 3/5 Compromise—the black presence—also overshadowed and helped to give final shape to the Declaration itself. In Jefferson's draft of the Declaration in which he catalogued the grievances of the colonies against King George III of England, a long section on the slave trade and slavery was included.

Jefferson wrote:

> "He (King George) has waged cruel war against human nature itself, violating its most sacred rights of life and liberty in the persons of a distant people, who never offended him, captivating and carrying them into slavery in another hemisphere, or to incur miserable death in their transportation thither. This piratical warfare, the opprobrium of *infidel* powers, is the warfare of the "Christian" King of Great Britain. Determined to keep open a market where MEN should be bought and sold, he has prostituted his negative for suppressing every legislative

attempt to prohibit or to restrain this execrable commerce: and that this assemblage of horrors might want no fact of distinguished die, he is now exciting those very people to rise in arms among us, and to purchase that liberty of which *he* has deprived them, by murdering the people upon whom *he* also obtruded them: thus paying off former crimes committed against the "liberties" of one people, with crimes which he urges them to commit against the lives of another." [3]

Jefferson reported in his *Notes* the reason for the deletion of the above passage. "(it) was struck out in complaisance to South Carolina and Georgia, who had never attempted to restrain the importation of slaves, and who on the contrary still wished to continue it. Our Northern brethren also I believe felt a little tender under those censures; for tho' their people have very few slaves themselves yet they had been pretty considerable carriers of them to others." [4]

Apparently, many of the ideals that we claim to be celebrating during this Bicentennial year, are ideals which we are superimposing in retrospect upon that earlier period in our nation's past, and not those which were shared by the country's leaders at the time. And human relations in this country are still struggling to thaw out the inequalities frozen into our constitution and the early customs and practices of all of the institutions.

Our problem has always been, and continues to be, the ease and readiness with which we proclaim universal statements of brotherhood, and just as easily practice the opposite in our human relationships. If our next two hundred years are to be any better than the past, we must learn to look honestly at our history. As Vincent Harding has so well put it: "An American history, which cannot contain the full story of the black pilgrimage is no more worthy than an American society that cannot bear the full and troublesome black presence in its midst." [5]

We must look honestly at our past if we are serious about making a new beginning in human relations. It seems that we are always making "new beginnings" in human relations in this country, and such a need reveals how deeply the rhetoric of democracy and the reality of black inequality is locked into the white American heart.

The country spent the first eight decades of its national existence trying to make democracy and slavery lie down together. The next two decades were spent trying to decide what limited roles would be permitted black people in the drama that is America. The 1896 Plessy vs. Ferguson decision of the Supreme Court and subsequent decisions over the next decade, seemed to settle the issue once for all.

Racial discrimination and segregation were indeed felt to be compatible with America's image of itself as the world's

greatest protector and defender of human rights. So we stood on the threshold of World War II, in 1941, with as segregated a society as had existed anywhere in the world.

Federal aid to housing was officially based on a philosophy of white racism. All branches of the Armed Forces were completely segregated along racial lines. New Deal programs were operating on racist principles. Almost all educational institutions, from nursery schools to universities, including theological seminaries and Bible colleges, operated to give aid and comfort to white racism.

The Supreme Court was still interpreting the exercise of citizenship rights along lines determined by the racial character of the litigants. The stepped-up defense industries excluded black employees, without presidential, legislative, judicial or religious opposition, until A. Philip Randolph organized the "March on Washington Movement" which resulted in President Roosevelt's capitulation to a demand for an Executive Order banning racial discrimination (which was never enforced).

White political primaries were the order of the day in our southern states. Hospitals, prisons, cemeteries, churches—all—were operated on racist policies. During the attempts to pass sweeping discrimination measures in the legislatures of the southern states, the Charleston *News and Courier* published an editorial attacking the Jim Crow law in travel which was under consideration in the South Carolina legislature:

> As we have got on fairly well for a third of a century, including a long period of reconstruction, without such a measure, we can probably get on as well hereafter without it, and certainly so extreme a measure should not be adopted and enforced without added and urgent cause.[6]

In an effort to show how ridiculous such a measure seemed, the editor went on to point out what other action would be necessary to be consistent with the principle of segregated street cars:

> If there must be Jim Crow cars on the railroads, there should be Jim Crow cars on the street railways. Also on all passenger boats . . . there should be Jim Crow waiting saloons at all stations and Jim Crow eating houses. . . . There should be Jim Crow sections of the jury box, and a separate Jim Crow dock and witness stand in every court—and a Jim Crow Bible for colored witnesses to kiss. . . . Perhaps, the best plan would be, after all, to take short cut to the general end . . . by establishing two or three Jim Crow counties at once, and turning them over to our colored citizens for their special and exclusive accommodation.[7]

By 1941 most of the measures so ironically ridiculed by the Charleston newspaper had in fact become general practice. No Jim Crow counties were set aside, but, after the Supreme Court struck down those city ordinances such as those from Baltimore

and Louisville, which attempted to legally restrict areas of the cities in which black Americans could live, restrictive covenants replaced them. Restrictive covenants became respectable methods for keeping "undesirable racial and other groups" out of certain neighborhoods.

Lynching was a common occurrence. More than a third of the states had laws on their books which denied to clergymen the right to join persons together in holy matrimony without using "race" as a determining factor![8]

There were some few changes following World War II in human relations, both in the way black Americans perceived themselves and the way they were perceived by others. Among the most significant changes was the desegregating of the Armed Forces by President Harry S. Truman in 1948.

On July 26, 1948, President Truman issued Executive Order #9981. It stated in section 1:

> It is hereby declared to be the policy of the President that there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed forces without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin. This policy shall be put into effect as rapidly as possible, having due regard to the time required to effectuate any necessary changes without impairing efficiency or morale.[9]

The pace of international events, the political implications of the demographic shifts in the black population from the rural South to the large urban areas of the North, and the intensifying of the Cold War helped to create greater sensitivity to the injustices being visited upon black Americans.

Consequently, the Supreme Court was more and more appealed to, not in attempts to demand "separate but equal" resources and privileges for black Americans, but by cases which called into question and challenged the constitutional validity of the principle of segregation itself. The Supreme Court responded with its famous Brown vs. Board of Education decision on May 17, 1954, which declared segregated education to be inherently unequal.

The following year saw the beginning of the celebrated Montgomery Bus Boycott. That movement not only introduced another stage in the black protest against the kind of relations which existed in this country between the races; more importantly, it introduced on the national and international stage, a young, dynamic and articulate proponent of nonviolent direct action.

Martin L. King, Jr.'s conscious effort to unite the principles of the Judao-Christian teachings and the ideals enunciated in the Declaration of Independence and the demands of the constitution, made an unprecedented appeal to many varied groups. It

was almost as if America had finally produced a prophet who was able to justify appeals to move the "is of injustice" toward the "ought of brotherhood."

"Black and white together—we shall overcome!" became the theme song of the inspiring fifties and early sixties. Mass marches and demonstrations for justice and brotherhood followed one another in rapid succession. They were interspersed with sit-ins, wade-ins, kneel-ins, and Freedom rides.

Court decisions, Executive Orders, Administrative rulings, and Civil Rights laws (1957, 1960, 1964, 1965) seemed to sound the death knell to racial segregation. The promise that was America seemed on the verge of becoming a dream no longer deferred.

The height of the Movement seemed to be reached when King stirred much of the nation with his famous "I Have A Dream" speech on August 28, 1963. After citing the past and present difficulties facing those who were demanding "Freedom Now!" King said:

> I say to you today, my friends, that in spite of the difficulties and frustrations of the moment I still have a dream. It is a dream deeply rooted in the American dream. I have a dream that one day this nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed: "We hold these truths to be self-evident; that all men are created equal. . . ." I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character . . . . And if America is to be a great nation this must become true.[10]

King was aware that much work remained to be done to make America what it should be. But the faith that America could be changed, would be changed, that God was in the struggle, that those who fought nonviolently was justice had cosmic companionship, should be enough to inspire all to work harder.

"With this faith," King said, "we will be able to hew out of the mountain of despair a stone of hope. With this faith we will be able to transform the jangling discords of our nation into a beautiful symphony of brotherhood. With this faith we will be able to work together, to pray together, to struggle together, to go to jail together, to stand up for freedom together, knowing that we will be free one day." [11]

King felt that the beloved community of brotherhood was worth struggling and suffering for. Few persons have manifested such faith in its possibility in this land, and few have given as unselfishly for its realization. On the night before he was to die a victim of the violence he had opposed throughout his career, King proclaimed: "I may not get there with you, but I want you to know tonight that we as a people will get to the promised land."

A few months before his death, King made an assessment of the struggle for the staff of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference meeting in retreat at Frogmore, South Carolina.

In describing the first phase of the Movement, King pointed out the differences between the expectations of the black participants in the struggle and their white liberal allies and supporters. "Negroes became outraged by blatant inequality. Their ultimate goal was total, unqualified freedom. The majority of the white progressives were outraged by the brutality displayed. Their goal was improvement or limited progression." [12]

King felt that where black Americans felt a sense of achievement after every hard-fought victory over some aspect of discrimination, the white liberals felt a sense of completion. Therefore, white resistance began to mount with each attempted move from one plateau to another. "The arresting of the limited forward progress by white resistance revealed the latent racism which is deeply rooted in our society. The short era of widespread goodwill evaporated rapidly." [13]

"I must admit," said King, "I'm not totally optimistic. But I cannot accept defeat . . . . our most fruitful course is to stand firm, move forward with aggressive nonviolence, accept disappointments and cling to hope. Our determined refusal not to be stopped will eventually thrust open the door to fulfillment."[14] The attempt on King's part in November, 1967, to prepare the SCLC for the Poor People's Campaign which was scheduled for the spring of 1968, is clearly different in tone from the vibrant call to commitment and high expectation in 1963.

The shadows of an ambivalent past caught up with our efforts on April 4, 1968, and they have been deepening and spreading every since that fateful day when an assassin's bullet wrote *finis* to the life and effort of a great spirit. What has followed in the wake of that crushing blow to brotherhood has brought us face to face with our past and a disturbing present.

The Disturbing Present

In the 22 years since the Supreme Court decision on segregated education, almost every legal barrier to full participation by blacks in American life has been lowered or removed. Few institutions will publicly declare themselves to be segregated. The voting Rights Act of 1965 has resulted in more black elected officials in every area of government. But real integration has been successfully thwarted in most areas.

In 1968, the Kouner Commission reported that America was rapidly moving toward two societies, one black, one white. But America had always been at least "two societies."

In 1903, W.E.B. DuBois said that the problem of the 20th

century was the problem of the color line. A recent article in *The Christian Century* stated that blacks and whites are growing further apart. The definition of integration offered by a black educator to the writer of that article might explain why the gap is wider than ever before. "It means whites controlling the traffic and selecting the vehicles." [15]

The same issue of *The Christian Century* carried an article entitled "The Rise of Symbolic Racism." Symbolic racism is the successful attempt to block further black advances by basing their resistance on cherished values of fair play and a sense of what is proper. "Symbolic racism thus replaces overt racism and permits a white majority to ignore the damage racial discrimination inflicts on society." [16]

"All is quiet on the Western Front" might well be the appropriate description of what has happened to the movement for justice in an open society. For the first time in more than a generation, none of the political candidates seeking nomination to high office feels it necessary to discuss civil rights, or what their position is in regard to the concerns which gripped the country in the pre-Nixon years.

Most of the organizations that were committed to significant societal changes in the past decade have either folded their tents and quietly gone away, changed their posture or, in fact, have become something else in order to continue to get support.

IFCO (Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization) recently sent out a call for a National Organizers Conference to be held in June, 1976. Out of the seventeen (17) workshops choices offered participants on the registration form, not one in clearly recognizable as dealing with racism.

The Supreme Court, by a 5-3 vote has restricted the reach of the 1965 Voting Rights Act which required southern states to get federal approval before changing their election procedures. In other ways, the Nixon-Ford court seems determined to return to the pre-Warren court years.

Julian Bond's testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights reflects a growing mood in the black community. He said:

> Political scientists don't usually think of courts as the most democratic institutions in a society, but to blacks for a generation, the courts have been the essence of our democracy, the main symbol of the fact or our belief—that we were finally becoming a part of this nation. Today that sense is going fast.[17]

In a speech at the 1976 Commencement of North Carolina Central University, Vernon Jordan, Director of the National Urban League, stated: "After the activist years of the 1960s, the United States is in a repressive period with regard to civil

rights. In this bicentennial year the symbol of the continuing struggle for civil rights and for equality has become the photograph of a Boston mob attacking two black men on the steps of City Hall with a flag pole bearing the stars and strips."

On May 17, 1976, the twenty-second anniversary of the Supreme Court decision on segregated education, President Ford met with Attorney General Levi to urge him to file a brief requesting the Supreme Court to review the Boston desegregation order which involved massive busing of black and white children.

Affirmative action programs in hiring and promoting blacks are under attack from many quarters, and the Supreme Court will likely rule on a case involving that principle in the near future.

One of several actions taken by the United Methodist Church at its recently concluded General Conference was the church's withdrawal of commitment to Project Equality, an ecumenically funded agency that presses for affirmative action in minority hiring and in buying practices. "A $20,000 annual funding to Project Equality's national office was cut to a token $1,000, throwing the whole future of that enterprise into question, since in recent years United Methodists were providing up to one-fourth of PE's budget." [18]

There is little question that the mood of the country has changed in the last seven years. The major institutions and major political leaders have done a very good job in getting the people once again to live all too comfortably with injustice, inequality, and the absence of a community where brotherhood would prevail.

As the shadows of the past have darkened the disturbing present, so their haunting powers tend to project an uncertain future.

The Uncertain Future

The kind of future that we desire and are willing to project, tends to inform our responses to the past, and our actions in the present. The forces in control in society tend to insist upon the rate of change so that they can orchestrate the relationships for the future.

Those who are the acknowledged leaders today are contributing to and pretending to reflect, what they perceive as a so-called conservative drift in the body politic. The so-called liberals are in hiding or in disarray in almost every institution.

The bicentennial is viewed as a call for looking back and turning the clock back in the area of human relations. There is a pervading fear that any efforts to move in any aggressive way

toward creating a more just and more equal society, will simply endanger the miniscule gains already made. "Holding the line" seems to be the most that anyone dares hope for.

It is maybe that institutions like the military will be able to continue to make progress in the area of human relations if for no other reason than that tension-filled and conflictual situations tend to threaten morale and efficiency. That possibility places an additional burden on the chaplains in the Armed Forces.

The chaplains may very well find themselves in a strategic position as they attempt to bring the insights of religion to bear upon the relationships which are often begun as a result of orders proceeding down the chain of command.

It would be ironic indeed, should the military chaplaincy, one of the few places one would *expect* to find a prophetic voice, provide the moral and religious leadership moving us toward the creation of a "beloved community." But strange, indeed, are the ways of God with man.

[1] Cf. Carl L. Becker, *The Declaration of Independence,* New York: Vintage Books, 1958, p. 186.
[2] Quoted in Albert P. Blaustein and Robert L. Zangrando, eds., *Civil Rights and the Black American,* New York: A Clarion Book, 1968, p. 49.
[3] Becker, *op. cit.,* pp. 180–181.
[4] Quoted, *Ibid.,* pp. 171–172.
[5] "The Afro-American Past," in *New Theology No. 6* edited by Martin E. Marty and Dean G. Peerman, London: The Macmillan Company, 1969, p. 168.
[6] Quoted in John Hope Franklin and Isidore Starr, eds., *The Negro in 20th Century America,* New York: Vintage Books, 1967, p. 6.
[7] *Ibid.*
[8] Cf. Herbert O. Edwards, "Racism and Christian Ethics in America," *Journal of the Committee of Southern Churchmen,* Winter, 1971, pp. 16–17.
[9] Blaustein and Zangrando, *op. cit., p. 385.*
[10] August Meier, et al, eds., *Black Protest Thought in the Twentieth Century,* 2nd ed., New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1971 (1965) pp, 349–50.
[11] *Ibid.,* p. 350.
[12] Martin Luther King, Jr., "A New Sense of Direction," *Worldview,* April, 1972, p. 5.
[13] *Ibid.,* p. 6.
[14] *Ibid.,* p. 10.
[15] April 28, 1976, p. 408.
[16] *Ibid.,* p. 403.
[17] *Washington Post,* May 23, 1976, p. C6.
[18] *The Christian Century,* May 26, 1976, p. 510.

THE FUTURE SIGNIFICANCE OF EDUCATION

Ch (COL) Clinton E. Browne, Ret.

The middle-aged, greying man makes a game winning badminton placement on his teenaged son, says "That's all for tonight, Jim," and heads for the shower. One-half hour later, looking refreshed, Mr. 2025 pauses before a door in his ranch home and flips a small blank card on the door. The neatly printed card now reads "Quiet—Dad is Studying." As "Dad" thinks "Light" the room is flooded with a soft but intense light. He seats himself at a large desk facing an electronic console and spins several knobs. As a screen comes to life the words "Central Instructional Development and Dissemination Center" appear. Mr. 2025 types in some cryptic letters and figures—SUADHO-ANGS-625-1. Slowly a classroom scene appears on the screen captioned "Syracuse University—Advanced Holographic Analysis of Genetic Structures—no. 625, Class 1." An instructor moves into the room but the screen is silent. Suddenly Mr. 2025 moves across the room with a mumbled "Hope I remember where I put that class card." Quickly the computer card is inserted in the slot of the console and the sound is activated. Dr. Williams begins the introduction of his course as "Dad" pulls a notebook in front of him.

One hour later, lecture completed, Dr. Williams leaves the classroom which fades away as an announcement appears briefly on the screen, IBM Contract No. 467352-9 Adult Ed. After stretching and walking across the room twice, Dad returns to the console and dials the Dissemination Center again. This time the code connects with the electronic educational retrieving section. As the main reference room comes into focus, a business-like voice asks, "Do you have mini-micro module reproduction capability? If so, state the numbers you desire." Dad consults his notebook and carefully reads three sets of twelve digit numbers. Within twenty seconds he hears, "You're in luck tonight. Get ready to copy the chips." Mr. 2025 removes three inch square mini-micro blanks from a drawer, places them in recording position and signals "copy." As Dad removes the modules, he shakes his head, turns off the power and rejoins his family with the comment, "I just got my reading for the new course—would you believe 1500 pages?"

This sketch of education futures is called a "scenario" and is one technique used in futures studies across many areas. How-

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ever, before taking a futuristic look at education, the time ranges and three key concepts of futurology need to be considered.

First, concern for the future falls into three time ranges: the near range (the next few years); the middle range (about 1980-1990); and the far range, (1990-2000 and beyond). Most interest has developed in the middle and far range with two books considering *The Next Hundred* and *The Next 500 Years*. One author has suggested that if a young man were to plan his career with sufficient vision today he might finish his graduate work in the seventies as a futurist specializing in the eighties, become an interdisciplinary analyst and critic of the eighties while living through that decade, and thereafter in the nineties become an historian of the eighties.[1]

Three key concepts in the developing field of futurism are "alternative future," "scenario," and "system break." The futurist is not so concerned with predicting the future as with developing "alternative" futures. These are different, perhaps even contrasting, sets of future conditions, some of which are extrapolated from related aspects of the present or highly probable near range conditions. Other alternative futures may be imaginary leaps with little apparent grounding in the present. These may be general, sweeping descriptions. In contrast "scenarios" are scripts spelling out the sequence of events leading into a future situation. Causal processes and decision points are highlighted in a step-by-step movement from the present to a hypothetical future. For this future alternative a number of scenarios may be constructed hypothesizing the different ways in which that particular future might develop. The alternate futures and the scenarios furnish the working material for addressing specific issues, with systematic comparison assessing alternative routes. However, long-range change has seldom been straightline, evolutionary development free from surprise.

Kenneth Boulding has suggested that mechanical systems (the solar system, for example), pattern systems (the genetic system of the biological world), and equilibrium sysems (ecological balance in nature) are fairly stable and predictable. Social systems, on the other hand, are evolutionary, involving processes of genetic mutation, the growth of knowledge, organizations, cultures, and societies. In the evolutionary process there is increase in complexity and sudden changes in the characteristics of the system itself. Boulding calls these sudden, un-

[1] Richard C. Lonsdale, "Futurism: Its Development, Content and Methodology," in *Educational Futurism 1985*, Berkeley, Cal.: (McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1971) p. 8.

predictable evolutionary system changes "system breaks." Since man finds himself in the evolutionary matrix of social systems his future will always contain unpredictable and ineradicable surprise.

In research and methodological study of alternative futures, the futurists use many sophisticated modern tools such as computers and simulation games. However, the most important resource of the futurist continues to be human reasoning power. "He often seeks to break away from conventional cognitive procedures and engage in 'lateral reasoning' to probe 'system breaks' or weigh 'counter-intuitive possibilities.' " [2] The computer is the most important mechanical tool. Delphi methodology, simulation models, the scenario, mathematical techniques of multiple correlation, factor analysis, cross-impact and trend-impact analysis are all resources for futures research.

If Alvin Toffler is right that "all education springs from images of the future and all education creates images of the future" [3] then the relationship of education and futures studies will be mutually profitable to both disciplines. Lord Ashby, former master of Clare College, Cambridge University, has suggested that in the past the analysis of the future has been the province of prophets rather than scholars. "Now," he said, "universities face the question, 'Should prophecy become an academic discipline?' "[4]

Contemporary Education: A Baseline for Futures Study in Education

Granting that the study of educational futures is necessary, we still need to establish a base of contemporary educational trends and innovations from which to project future alternatives. In the past fifteen years the schools have been almost inundated with efforts of every conceivable kind to inject some ingredient of change or innovation. Many of these innovations have been attempts to face current problems and needs. Among the most pressing issues have been:

A. Controversy over equality of educational opportunity;
B. Clash between cognitive and affective views of education;

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[2] Harold G. Shane, *The Educational Significance of the Future* (Washington, D.C.: World Future Society, 1972) p. 2.

[3] Alvin Toffler, ed. *Learning for Tomorrow: The Role of the Future in Education* (N.Y.: Random House, 1974) p. 19.

[4] Malcolm G. Scully, "After the First 100 Years, Whither the University," *The Chronicle of Higher Education* XII (March 1, 1976):7.

C. Conflict over the education of culturally different groups;
D. Emerging power relationships in school control;
E. Alternatives to traditional schooling;
F. Schools and the counter culture;
G. Technology and schooling;
H. Financial problems ushering in the emphasis on accountability.

The attempt to resolve these issues has introduced the following contemporary educational innovations or emphases:

A. Curriculum reform.

Going back about twenty years there has been a cycle of "discipline-centered curriculum reform," a reversion back to emphasis on the academic subject. The cycle following this is focusing on "total curriculum." The forecast is that "total curriculum" will peak out and merge into "humanistic curriculum." Elements of this are now emerging in such activities as values-clarification programs and low-key sensitivity groups in elementary schools.

B. Student-centered teaching is expressed in the concept of continuous progress, individualized instruction, nongrading, vertical grouping, and alternative schools. All these innovations are attempts to meet students where they are and answer their individual needs.

C. Desegregation of schools, enforced bussing, prescribed cultural and ethnic studies have been introduced to promote equality of opportunity.

D. Increasing use of technology is found in programmed learning, computer-assisted teaching, and advanced audio-visual resources.

E. Emphasis on lifelong learning with "drop-out," "drop in" capability and educational opportunity for persons from pre-kindergarten to old age is being developed.

F. Current financial strictures on all classes of public elementary, secondary schools, universities as well as private colleges have introduced the concept of accountability. Accountability, in turn, requires at least some quantification of results. Thus "measurable objectives," and "teacher-competency based curriculums" have been introduced into elementary, secondary, and post-secondary education.

Educational futurism enters when we turn from the present educational scene and ask "Where do we go from here?" Since there may be system breaks and linear change is most doubtful, what are the future alternatives for the year 2000?

Four propositions may be considered essential to the educational significance of the future. First, we must work out and choose rationally among educational alternative futures. Second, the planning of a continuum of lifelong educational experiences must be so thorough and satisfying that public support is rallied to provide financial resources. Third, the continuing education process, both from the teaching and learning ends can be refined and developed in such a way as to eliminate present problems in the development of an effective learning environment. Fourth, ideas, resources and potential innovations are already available on the U. S. educational scene to provide the opportunity for a linear progress toward a far more satisfying educational experience.

Possible system breaks vitally affecting schools might occur which could bring on horrible results or, on the positive side, what is now unimaginable constructive change. On the negative side the potentiality of nuclear war; world-wide famine with unchecked polution of the environment, and critical depletion of natural resources; and a social revolution producing anarchy in a society unable to provide controls, could threaten complete destruction of the educational system we know today.

Positive system breaks might result from developments in automation and cybernation that would increase production to such an extent as to provide much more leisure time for education. Development in communications might be so unimaginably great as to provide access to stored information world-wide that would revolutionize present instructional methods. Finally, development in medicine, genetics, geriatrics and biochemistry might result in new knowledge and techniques that would facilitate the education of a person through drugs, chemicals, transplants, and direct brain stimulation.

Having hedged the future with system break possibilities, let us consider the most likely educational futures development.

A. *One educational futures element on which all futurists agree is the continued development of educational technology or technology with educational implications.* Here the assumption is that the computer will be refined further to become ever more useful for instruction, individualized pacing, educational management, and information storage and retrieval. The fantastic data storage and retrieval capacity of lasers may enable them to supercede computers. IBM has already developed an eight-colored laser beam memory-storage system which can record one hundred million bits of information on a square inch of photographic film. A further development associated with las-

ers but not completely dependent on them is holography. The holograph is a photographic record of an interference pattern between reflected light waves from an object and a second wave of interfering light. A three-dimensional real image of the object is produced which one can see around by changing positions. The greatest promise here is the possibility of three-dimensional TV and motion pictures, and microscopes that would display the three dimensional structure of complex molecules. All of these communication possibilities will make possible a new type of educational facility called the "Central Instructional Development and Dissemination Center." It will electronically beam instructional materials to schools and homes, making use of world-wide data banks (formerly known as libraries). This will especially facilitate lifelong learning with individual programming through a home computer.

One further technological development may be applied physiologically to the learner, either in the form of direct electronic communication via implanted electrodes that stimulate the brain or the use of drugs (hormones or enzymes) to facilitate learning.

B. *The curriculum of the educational future will represent a reconciliation of the cognitive versus affective conflict.* Recent years have seen the re-emphasis on fundamental cognitive skills as citizen groups have organized task forces to seek restoration of 3 Rs mastery for all students. However, the affective aspects of learning have been promoted through the insights of humanistic psychology on the place of motivation and values in promoting efficient learning. Especially one can expect a more comfortable socio-emotional atmosphere for the six to twelve year olds. The development of the cycle of humanistic curriculum has been suggested already. This humanistic emphasis also calls for maximum individualization of learning which can only be provided if many educational options are open. This would include provision for the handicapped, the gifted, alternative schools, career and vocational choices as well as the traditional academic track.

In higher education there will be further concern with the broad definition of education to embrace all elements of the college experience, the extracurricular as essential for all-around student development.

Even more serious financial problems of supporting the educational system, both public and private will force the development of educational goals, stated as instructional, measurable objectives of the curriculum to meet the requirements of accountability. Such instructional objectives need not conflict with the goal of individualizing education since the instruc-

tional goals might be developed on the same subject for students on three program paths such as Career, Pre-Technical, and Pre-College.

C. *That the organization of education will change is certain.* Already the development toward openness is seen in many innovations that are directed toward the individualizing of the educational experience. For example there will be changes in the use of clock and calendar time. Financial considerations favor a year-round school and some experimentation in this area is already taking place. This would permit high school graduation earlier. Such year-round schools might accommodate better differing and changing life styles (such as winter vacations). Four quarter and 45-15 plans (45 days of school, 15 days of vacation), evening high schools, and four-day school weeks represent innovations which may be widespread even by 1985. It has been suggested that the flexible, all-year school may emerge as the institution most capable of adapting to the needs of the individual and the changing society. Because such a school makes optimum use of time it may prove the most economically efficient as well.

D. *Equally certain as technological development will be the changed role of the teacher for the year 2000.* The stereotype of one teacher per-class per-subject per-period will give way to a more complex functioning which will involve the teacher in at least four primary operations: specialist in specific teaching roles; teaching team member; differentiated staff specialist; and guide in individualized instruction. The multiplicity of functions that will be subsumed under these different areas indicate that the teacher of 2000 will need to be a professional even better trained than today.

E. The final report from the National Board on Graduate Education completed this year describes some significant trends in higher education.[5] Future educational needs indicate a steady reduction in demand for Ph.D's to serve in colleges through the 1980s. A reduced rate of growth in Research and Development expenditures will knock out still other need for doctorates. Add to this the continuing decline in total amount of financial support available for graduate students and the increased number of women and minority students seeking graduate education and a period of adjustment seems inevitable. The National Board, therefore, has issued a call for increased experimentation with nontraditional programs serving "new clienteles" and for the encouragement of greater diversity

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[5] Philip W. Seanos, "Graduate Schools Urged to Experiment, "*The Chronicle of Higher Education* (January 19, 1976) p. 1.

among graduate schools. The "new clientele" in mind could be older students, fully employed or part-time students, nonresidential students, and specially-tailored programs for community college teachers, many of whom currently fall into a no-man's land of professional preparation between Ph.D. and secondary level training. *This concern for "new clientele" introduces the final futures educational change which may be the most probable development of all those forecast.*

F. *"Lifelong learning," "continuing education," "adult learning," "Nontraditional" are some of the terms describing an educational clientele which by 2000 will ask for educational opportunities from "pablum to probate."* Within the last two years the number of learners age 35 or older enrolled in some form of adult education has increased 30%. With increasing leisure time, early retirements, and accessibility of education, continuing education is expected to flourish to such an extent that the 21st Century may well be called "The Age of Education." Such a "learning society" will require a philosophy of continuing education commensurate to its potential as a social force. A. A. Liveright, former secretary of the International Congress of University Adult Education, has suggested in Alvin Eurick's *Campus 1980* a proposal for a college of continuing education composed of four institutes. These would be:

1. The Institute for Personal and Family Development which would help the adult in achieving maximum effectiveness in family and personal relations;
2. The Institute for Humanities and Liberal Development which would promote self-realization and personal fulfillment;
3. The Institute for Occupational and Professional Development which would meet the needs of the adult as worker; and
4. The Institute for Civic and Social Development, which would prepare the adult for participation in community, national and world affairs.[6]

In concluding this look at promising educational futures, we must note that the first step toward these desirable alternatives of 2000 is an honest evaluation of some threatening present realities. In a startling article, "Murder in Academe: The Demise of Education," Fred M. Heckinger states and documents a thesis that "America is in headlong retreat from its commitment to education." He cites evidences such as the voting down of 54% of all school bond issues in 1975 as compared to 11%

[6] A. A. Liveright, "Learning Never Ends: A Plan for Continuing Education," in *Campus 1980*, ed. Alvin C. Eurich (N. Y.: Delacorte Press, 1968) p. 157 ff.

voted down in 1960; and a political pincher attack on education from conservative right and the radical left. At the same time more moderate critics, who correctly identified and opposed the school's failures, joined in a sweeping condemnation of the American schools as joyless, autocratic and oppressive. The economic recession and inflation have exacerbated the financial problems of financing schools; raised steeply the cost of education to students while depressing the number of jobs and salaries of 1975 college graduates. One hears such questions as "Is a college education worth it?" or "Aren't we sending too many people to college?" There is talk of reducing the number of years of compulsory education, a threatening breach in the dike of universal education. The value of general education is being questioned by a new vocationalism. Finally, there is a retreat from higher education as the financial investment rises while the monetary return on an employer's market drops. Here futures consideration enters the scene again. Future alternatives must be spelled out on the results of a continued educational recession as a threat to all aspects of America's future. At the same time a forward-looking education agenda must chart a future in which education continues to provide the glue for democracy.

Nationwide movements in the past have faced threat to American education and have been successful in turning the retreat to forward movement. Heckinger urges:

> In this Bicentennial year no other objective seems more urgent than helping the American people regain their faith in education. The incentive to do so is elemental: to prevent the decline and fall of American democracy.[7]

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[7] Fred M. Heckinger, "Murder in Academe: The Demise of Education," *Saturday Review* 3 (March 20, 1976): 11–18.

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THE MAKING OF FUTURE MINISTERS

John Killinger, Ph.D.

Having had the experience of meeting my young architect on an airplane, I continued for several weeks under its spell. I found, in fact, that my clairvoyant friend's observations about the church, delivered so casually and almost naively, grew in importance to me until they nearly became an obsession.

It was during this period, when my mind could turn to little else but would automatically revert to our discussion of futuristics, that I had a strange and wonderful dream.

In the dream, I found myself transported to a seminary campus several decades hence, visiting with the future ministers and teachers of the church my architect friend had envisioned.

As in most dreams, what is reasonable and what in fact exists stood in no opposition to each other. Nor shall I, in relating what I can remember of the content of that dream, be at any pains to separate them. I shall simply report, as adequately and accurately as I am able, what I saw and heard on that unusual campus.

I should say at the outset that my impressions of the campus itself are rather hazy. Although I saw many things in clear detail, items of panoramic magnitude were often less than precise. I distinctly recall, however, a constant sense of amazement at the aesthetic pleasure afforded by the general environment. There was a feeling of tranquillity everywhere, in the buildings as well as on the grounds, though not of idle tranquillity, for much seemed to be happening at all times.

I believe there was a very agreeable use of space in the buildings, so that I never experienced a feeling of either crowdedness or loneliness. Often I begin to remember green plants growing indoors, providing a sense of freshness and serenity, though when I try to focus on them in any particular setting I am unable to do so. The same elusiveness occurs when I attempt to recall the plush carpeting which I associate with the rooms and hallways. The moment I concentrate on it, I become unsure and wonder if the floors were not hardwood, brought to a beautiful, clear sheen, with occasional rugs of bold Danish or modern Persian design.

My guide through the extraordinary campus (I confess that even he came and went according to my mode of perception) was

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From THE SECOND COMING OF THE CHURCH by John Killinger. Copyright 1974 by Abingdon Press.

both a student and not a student there. That is, he appeared to identify himself with all the others who were there, yet transcended them in some ways, as though he had already progressed through all the stages of learning and were now beyond the scene. He shall remain nameless to the reader, as indeed he did to me in the entirety of the dream.

Perhaps, in the light of the foregoing paragraph, I should say a word here about the character of the students in this seminary. As I was told by my guide, they were neither admitted nor graduated by the tedious recording processes at use in former times. They simply came, when it was time for their seminary experience, and left, when the time was ripe for them to do so. Only, having left, they continued to return as often as they felt the need or the ability to profit from doing so. Being told this, I noticed that many learners present appeared to be in their middle or later years, some even approaching senescence. There seemed to be no artificial divisions among them—all were engaged in the activity of learning and growing, regardless of age.

My guide said that most ministers in the church of that time found it useful and normal to return to a seminary for at least a month a year to re-engage themselves in various problems at a more intense level than was often possible in the parish. There was no literal specification that they must do so and no rule regarding their absence from the churches. They merely came and went as the need arose, making whatever arrangements were necessary at the time.

Didn't the church members complain of the looseness of this arrangement? I inquired of the guide. No, he said, they regarded it as important to them as well as to the minister, and besides, the churches were structured in such fashion as to make the regular attendance of the ministers unnecessary. The idea of the clergy as enablers, so widely discussed in the sixties and seventies, had become widely accepted in the churches, and now the laity did much of the actual ministering work of the parishes, leaving the clergy free as sort of experts-in-residence.

This is as good a place as any to introduce the curricular structure of the new seminary, for it will help to explain how ministers occupied in churches for most of the year can return to the seminary and enter with any integrity into the ongoing theological program. Perhaps it will be of interest to those who have been vitally interested in upgrading methods of continuing education in seminaries but have always had the desperate feeling that even the best continuing education programs are mere adjuncts or stepchildren of the regular programs.

Let us begin with the cinemetronics lab, which I found to be a fascinating area of the future campus. I had seen many rooms

where earnest discussions appeared to be taking place, but had seen nothing which I identified as formal classes in any of the disciplines so familiar to me when I was in seminary. Accordingly, I inquired of my host about the lectures in church history, Bible, and theology, assuming that it would be very interesting to enter among a few of them and remark how they differed, if at all from what I had known.

At that he laughed good-naturedly and ushered me into a section of the main building whose appearance resembled that of the language laboratories presently found in many universities. There were perhaps forty or fifty desks or console tops, each mounted by a set of headphones, a small switchboard, and an assortment of viewing screens, the largest of which might easily have been a television screen.

At my guide's invitation, I sat at one of the desks and fitted the headphones to my ears.

"Now," he said, consulting a small manual which lay on the surface of the desk, "name a period or person in theological history that fascinates you."

I believe my first impulse was to name Augustine or Luther, but, fearing that either would seem an obvious and unsophisticated choice, I pronounced the name of Thomas Bradwardine. I had once had a church history professor who had written a thesis on Bradwardine, and he had spent more time on him in classroom lectures than on any of the popular reformers. Now I could recall almost nothing of the man or his thought, so considered him a reasonable choice on which to test the machinery before me.

The guide found the proper reference in the manual, adjusted a few switches on the console, and instantly I was not only hearing about Bradwardine and Gabriel Biel and the whole nominalist controversy in the late medieval church, but was seeing a movie on the screen as well, depicting scenes in which the eminent theologians of that day argued and contended for their positions.

I was amazed. In quick succession, I tuned in to depictions of the councils of Nicaea, Chalcedon, and Trent, the controversy between Augustine and Pelagius, Henry VIII's proclamation of the Act of Supremacy, and John Wesley's experience at Aldersgate. "What a way to learn history!" I remarked as I removed the headset.

"Don't get up," said my mentor. "There's more."

He pressed a button and another area of the console lit up.

"How's your biblical Greek?" he asked.

"Atrocious, I'm afraid," I said.

"Then we'll start with simple verb forms."

An uncomplicated sentence in *koine* Greek appeared on an oblong screen.

"Translate it, if you can," said the guide.

"The man is. . . throwing. . ." I couldn't complete the sentence.

The guide pushed a red button.

". . . a javelin," read the screen. Then the words vanished and new ones appeared, again in Greek. This time I could read the entire sentence. It said: "The javelin throws the man."

A machine with a sense of humor!

"Almost all our basic teaching," explained the guide, "is programmed for machine instruction: history, Bible, languages, even sociology, ethics, anthropology, psychomythology, and theology."

"But how?"

"How can theology be programmed? Of course it can't be completely. But the history of theology can be, and students can be required by the machines to respond creatively to certain theological puzzles which have perplexed men for ages, utilizing where possible the insights of Spinoza, Schleiermacher, Tillich, and other giants of theological discussion. When the student has been through a full regimen of tapes with one of our machines, he is a pretty competent theologian himself, at least as far as he can be equipped out of the theology of the past. Then he is ready for his *real* work."

The real work, as I was to learn, came in the small group sessions which were considered the heart of the new theological training. But that is getting ahead of my story. My guide had one other trick to show me at the console.

This time flipping a blue switch, he explained that I was now to witness something I was very likely unprepared for in my own theological training. Actually, as it turned out, it was not theological at all, but had to do with the improvement of creativity and originality in thinking.

"This is one of the newer concepts," he said, "and we have one the two systems now being pioneered in this country. The developers of the system believe that one of the greatest impediments to free and creative theological work is the tendency of the mind to idolize old conceptualizations and forget that they were once only tentative formulas. The system is therefore programmed to disrupt fixated thinking by various visual and linguistic playgrams. For example . . ."

As he talked, he pushed a combination of numbers, and the oblong screen lit up with these words: REDIMMED BY THE BLOAT OF THE LIMB. When I fitted the headphones to my ears, a taped voice said: "This is an exercise in word-play.

Please recognize the traditional religious phrase disguised under the mutated logogram. Silently form the logogram on your lips. Enjoy the freedom of the new formulation. Now we shall proceed to another phrase."

The former phrase vanished and a new one appeared. The voice on the tape provided instruction as before. One after another, the phrases came and went: THE KLANDOM OF GOD, THE BRIGGING OF GOAT NOOSE, THE ZONE OF GOAD, DEBT ON THE GROSS, THE THROWN OF GOT . . . .

I was fascinated, but also disturbed. "I don't know," I said to my host. "This is intriguing. But something inside me feels uneasy, as if I were blaspheming or something."

He laughed.

"Not really," he said. "Quite the contrary. Words and phrases become blasphemous themselves when fastened upon. They lose their transparency, their sense of discovery. Then it is necessary to disunite ourselves from them in order to proceed to new discoveries.

"The same is true of visual images. Therefore the system presents alternate and quite opposite pictures of such abstract concepts as God, messiah, faith, love, and so on. For example, God may be represented by such various images a a gull flying over a rocky shoreline, a gleaming supercomputer, or even an empty screen with no picture at all. Love may be seen as a mother cradling an infant, as a government employee working late at his desk, or as a killer standing over his victim. The viewer is forced to recognize the infinitely wide range of instances in which love assumes different forms, even hatred and aggression.

"There is one wrinkle in the system I would like to show you but can't because we're having some mechanical problems the engineers haven't cleared up yet. See this little instrument—"

He handed me a metal object similar in shape to a ballpoint pen.

"This is a laser pen. It writes with light, and can be used to alter patterns on the video screen. Certain exercises are provided in which the student is asked to perform his own mutations directly on phrases and drawings flashed before him. The machine then responds by further altering the phrasing or configurations, and requests the student to follow suit. I have seen a clever, imaginative student make up to nine or ten 'plays' with the machine before it moves on to a new problem."

I had to admit that I felt two emotions simultaneously, one a sense of awe and excitement at the sophistication of the process (despite the mechanical breakdown), and the other a feeling of

having been cheated by not having such practice in my own experience.

My host generously reminded me that persons have used similar methods for centuries, and that the machine had merely refined the mechanics of them. Playfulness and creativity have always been intimately allied, for it is only in play that the mind breaks its customary circuits and explores new territory and new combinations of data.

Sitting in this mechanical Shangri-La, I could not forbear inquiring about the reading of books. I had seen no library at all, and the library was once a central feature of any seminary or university campus. Didn't the students read as they had in my day?

"Not very much," replied by guide. "We have largely made the transition to oral and imagistic learning with little emphasis on linear training. Our students are all rapid readers, of course, and have been since they were five or six years old. But much of their reading is done at television consoles, where the entire collection of the World Information Center is at their fingertips. That includes art, drama, movies, and so on, as well as ordinary printed materials. And, for those who desire them, of course, there are still the old pobs, though there is little need for them anymore."

"Pobs?"

"You didn't have pobs? I'm sorry. I didn't realize when they came into use. 'Pob' is an anagram for 'printout book.' It's a looseleaf book of chemically treated plastic leaves capable of receiving phototelegraphic images from a master printer at the WIC. They were the rage for a while, but now it's even getting hard to obtain maintenance for our transmitter. Occasionally we get a student—usually an older one—who still has a strong linear attachment and seems to require a pob. But there aren't too many anymore."

I don't know whether it was the amazement I felt or what in a dream might pass for fatigue or hunger, but a this point my host suggested a change of pace. He led me into what appeared to be a relatively smaller version of a gymnasium, where a number of men and women together were participating in various kinds of recreational activities. Some were working on parallel bars, some were doing group calisthenics, and some appeared to be taking part in some kind of yoga exercise. I felt immediately more comfortable at being in what was at least a more familiar setting.

"Was much emphasis placed upon sports and play activities in your seminary?" inquired my host.

"Very little," I said. "We played tag football on the lawn, and

got together occasionally for basketball or tennis. But only on a voluntary and scattered basis."

"Physical training is an integral part of our program." he replied. "Our therapists are as important to us as any staffers we have. I don't know what we would do without this aspect of our training. I can go away for a week, and, if I don't continue my exercises faithfully, I feel myself becoming sluggish and inert, mentally as well as physically.

"We don't have any requirement of a specific number of hours to be spent in the gym or pool, or course, any more than we have other sorts of requirements. But I can't imagine that anyone spends fewer than ten or twelve hours a week here. Some friends of mine are probably here thirty to thirty-five hours. It's amazing what it does for their total personalities as seminarians. They're probably the best students here."

My smile tried to mask an inward wince. I thought of all the times I had refused a tennis or handball invitation because I had been "too busy" to take part at the time.

But something my host had said about requirements intrigued me. "You mean there are no requirements of any kind?" I asked.

"None whatsoever."

"But how can you operate like that?" I asked. "Surely there must be *some* rules. How do you know when a student is ready to graduate?"

This time it was my host who smiled. "We gave up admission and graduation requirements years ago," he said. "We finally admitted, in the case of the former, that we were only accidentally correct in some of our admissions, and were often wrong, because we simply could not test may of the intangible factors related to seminary training. And as for the latter, graduation . . . . Well, I guess you might say that we abandoned that to remove the false notion that one really ever completes his education.

"Our students remain here until they feel that it is less fruitful to be here than in a primary involvement situation. Then they go out to work somewhere else, in a church or school or other form of employment.

"But of course they rarely stay away. Most return frequently to work on specific problems confronting them or simply to put a new edge on themselves. As I explained earlier, what you once called 'continuing education' has become a way of life for us, not a mere adjunctive program."

"But," I questioned, "how can you assess a person's performability for a prospective employer or for other educational

environments? We always depended heavily on grades and quality-point averages and the like."

"Oh, that's no problem," my host assured me. "Each student is simply rated, when necessary, on a quality chart by his fellow students. We have found this to be much more adequate than former assessments by teachers, whose angle of vision on the student tended to be vertical and not horizontal, as the case is with both fellow students and the people with whom the person will be working outside."

I had to admit the idea was feasible.

By this time my host and I had jogged around the elevated track several times, and he led me through an air-screen door into a large room where there was a swimming pool. We splashed into the water and swam the length of the pool several times, then crawled into one of the swirl baths adjacent to it. As the warm water whirled pleasantly around us, my guide continued his introduction of the new seminary program.

One of the things we discussed during this pleasant interval was the use of chemotherapy in the new program. As yet, said the guide, it was in the experimental stage, but showed great promise. An outgrowth of the earlier usage of LSD and marijuana as perception-altering aids, the present concern was to find harmless drugs which could be used under controlled conditions to restore balance to impaired personalities and induce consciousness-expanding practices which would subsequently become automatic in students who habitually exercised too much restraint over their imaginations and emotions.

"Hasn't here been objection to this from puritanical church people?" I asked.

"Some," he replied, "but the experiments are not highly publicized, and they are being conducted on only the most promising respondents, with extremely capable supervisors. I have hear some reports, perhaps exaggerated, that within a decade every seminarian will be routinely checked by computerized chemical analysis and will be provided with daily supplies of the additives required by his system. It may sound preposterous, but I am prepared to believe it, in the light of other remarkable innovations in the past few years."

From the bath, my host led me into a carpeted dressing room, where each of us received a deep massage from the student attendants. Apparently I fell asleep on the table, or perhaps my dream was temporarily interrupted, for when I resumed my inspection of the seminary I was with a different guide, a woman of more mature years, though presently a student in the seminary. We were sitting in a small, comfortably furnished room with nine or ten other persons.

I suppose I simply intuited that she was my hostess, as no exchange had thus far passed between us, and we were both involved in the procedures of the entire group.

I had been in a similar group before, I thought, as this one appeared to be functioning as a sort of sharing or sensitivity group. Very personal things were being spoken in a most open and casual fashion, as though those present were accustomed to live candidly before one another at all times. No topic was too intimate for serious discussion, and, in the space of what must have been two hours, various persons aired feelings of emotional distress, occupational uncertainity, sexual difficulty, and attraction or hostility toward other group participants. My hostess spoke of her sense of frustration at having entered the ministry rather late in life, after the loss of her husband, and of having less time for her vocational fulfillment than many others had. I thought her very graceful and beautiful, and wondered how she could ever experience negative feelings about herself.

Afterwards, as we strolled through the neatly manicured grounds and sat on a bench in an alcove surrounded by a semicircle of boxwoods, she talked of the importance of the therapy sessions to her. I conjectured that they must be extremely meaningful to all who are involved in them. How many students, I wondered, availed themselves of such personal growth experiences?

"All that I know," she said. "It is not a requirement, of course. But who would want to miss it? It is a marvelous opportunity. Besides, how would one proceed as a leader in a church without first having had such experiences?"

It now occurred to me, as it had not before, that this was the new seminary's method of developing group leadership—not by rote teaching procedures, but by actual participation in growth groups. I asked who were the leaders in these groups.

"I'm not really sure," she replied. "You see, we don't always attend the same group. Circulating is encouraged to develop an ability for 'instant immediacy.' Even leaders circulate. It is entirely possible that groups meet occasionally without any leader's being present.

"The truth is," she said, "leaders are awfully hard to identify here. I suppose it has to do with the whole leadership system."

I confessed that I know nothing of the system. It now struck me that, while I had seen some persons who appeared to be discussion leaders, I had seen no one whom I would really have taken for a professor.

"Oh," she said, "we don't have professors. Not for years now, I understand. They're all at the GTC. We have only advanced

students or facilitators—what they called 'fellows' when I was an undergraduate years ago."

"Wait a minute," I pleaded. "It is all too fast for me. What is GTC?"

"I'm sorry," she said. "GTC is General Theological Center. There are two in this country, you know, one in the East, in New York, and the other in San Francisco. And there are several others around the world. Western Europe has one in Geneva. They are sort of theological think tanks, I suppose you would call them—societies of elitist scholars and terribly creative persons who interact with one another and do their work and then communicate the benefits of it to the various seminaries."

"You mean you never see them? You don't have professors here?"

"Well, it really isn't a problem. We do have the Telly-coms—that's Telecommunication Conferences. They are regular multichannel sessions in which various topics are discussed by all the professors who are concerned with them. Students are on the video too and can enter the discussions. They're often very exciting, especially when one of the facilitators who is especially keen challenges the position of one or more of the professors. Of course that's the way they get to be professors. Only the brightest and most articulate persons are chosen."

"How are they chosen? By a committee?"

"No. They are proposed and voted on by the entire population of students in all the world seminaries."

"Wow."

"Excuse me?"

"I'm sorry." I said. "I was just thinking about how radical that would have sounded when I was a theological student."

"I suppose so. The radicals today are those who insist that the power of selecting professors ought to be vested in the laity of the church. They accuse the seminaries of exclusivism, and of operating too independently of the constituency."

"How do you feel about it?" I asked.

"Oh, I don't know. I suppose I am old enough to be excited by the way things are now. But I have great respect for the arguments of the more radical voices in the church."

"Tellycoms. I must remember that when I wake up." I recall having thought. It seemed such a practical way of reducing overhead by simply avoiding unnecessary duplication of function and labor. And facilitators. I liked the word. I was also fascinated by the global dimension the church and its training centers had apparently adopted.

"Is there considerable unanimity in the world church," I

asked, "to enable the various seminaries and centers to conduct profitable joint discussions?"

"Oh yes," replied my hostess. "Or perhaps the profitable discussions help to provide the unanimity. But, either way, there is a great functional harmony in world Christianity. Much more than when I was younger. It isn't a unanimity of opinion, you understand. Only a willingness to pursue certain basic goals, with absolute freedom regarding the routes to be taken. There isn't the parochialism of interest there once was. All the issues now—everything from education and agriculture to urbanology and politics—are genuinely global issues."

"Is this a common attitude?"

"I would say it is. The church doesn't get the credit for it, of course. I think people just finally realized that we couldn't inhabit the same terrestrial space any longer without thinking of the whole world and planning for everybody. The church just sort of tuned in on what everybody knew, or at least on what they suspected."

"You mentioned the global issues," I said. "How do the seminary and the church relate to those?"

"I'm sorry—?"

"I mean, how is theology done in relation to all the issues?"

"Oh, I see. Yes. Well, you must understand that theology is no longer regarded as a language unto itself. No respectable theologian, even at the facilitator level, is competent in theology alone. Most are trained in several disciplines, including psychology, sociology, and the various arts. Usually it has to do with personal aptitude. But there are none of the artifical boundaries I remember having encountered as an undergraduate. All disciplines are regarded as tools or techniques for the study of life itself—and the fuller the tool kit the better!

"This philosophy is implemented in the GTCs and in seminaries by involving professors and facilitators whose principal work has lain outside theology per se. They know enough to be conversant theologically—indeed, today even the children in the churches are—but they are really experts in fields such as social engineering, pharmaceutical therapy, and psychoanthropology."

About this time we were interrupted in our pleasant conversation—I had no idea of the time—by my original host, who appeared before us and said that he really wanted me to attend the daily case study with him. I thanked my lady friend, who had entertained me most graciously, and we walked along the curving pathway to a sort of open building where the participants in one of the preannounced case studies were already gathering.

Here, explained my host, we were at the most vital part of the seminary undertaking. All other aspects of the students' training—technical, physical, therapeutic, and even devotional—came into play in these sessions. They were central to the understanding of how the seminary functioned.

A young woman of Oriental descent sat near what I presumed to be the head of the room, there being a large videoscreen on the wall slightly above and to the right of her head. She began the session by addressing the rest of us—perhaps twenty in all—who were seated casually in a sort of oval or circle.

"This is Study Section 18-A," she said. "Our situation for today will now be shown to you."

At once the screen behind her was filled with angry faces, and loud, nearly hysterical voices broke the quietness of the setting. It soon became evident that we were witnessing some kind of political demonstration.

As the film progressed, the story that unfolded went something like this: A city council in a town of approximately two hundred thousand inhabitants had just voted to cancel univehicular service—a kind of centralized transportation service—to an outlying suburban district on the grounds that, federal appropriations having failed to materialize, the city treasury could not afford to continue operations in the area. The enormity of the situation for the residents of the district became apparent to me when it was pointed out by my guide that individual vehicular transportation was no longer permitted within city boundaries, and that nearly three thousand, five hundred men, women, and children would suddenly be left without locomotion for traveling to schools, offices, and commercial destinations within the center of the city. Some would travel by bicycle, very possibly, but many would find the withdrawal of services a severe inconvenience indeed. The persons whose faces had first flashed on the screen were residents of the district who had walked several miles in a march on the offices of the city council and were engaged in a vociferous protest. Two persons were finally arrested, and one woman had to be hospitalized for exhaustion and hypertension.

Now, broadly put, the case study question for the day was: How should the churches of the affected district respond to this emergency in the daily lives of their parishioners?

As discussion proceeded, several facets of the question were delineated.

First, what reaction should be made to the real situation, i.e., the loss of vehicular service? What political force was available in the churches themselves, both the churches within the area and sympathizing churches outside, for redressing the problem?

Could legal action be instituted against the federal government, the city government, or both, to restore the service which had been interrupted?

Second, what immediate help could be provided to the inconvenienced persons in the area? For example, what arrangements could be made for delivery of necessary food and other provisions? What emergency measures could be drafted for the continuance of the children's education?

Third, what kinds of forums, if any, should be arranged to provide an airing of the people's grievances? What speakers in the city should be asked to participate in such hearings?

Fourth, how did any of the teachings of Christianity assume particular relevance in this real crisis? What kind of social and personal growth might be aimed at in the solution of the problem?

Soon the group had subdivided into smaller, more manageable units to grapple with the aspects of the situation. The division did not occur haphazardly, but with what appeared to me to be a high degree of orderliness and intelligence—persons having special legal, social, psychological, or other qualifications being deployed to the units where their skills might prove most useful. Almost at once the groups were eagerly at work in various parts of the room, producing a great buzz of argument and conversation.

My host soon fell to discussing the whole plan and merits of the case study system with me, and thereby prevented my following the present topic to its final disposition. But what he had to say proved very enlightening, and I could hardly grieve at having missed anything.

There would be much more to the present case than a mere analysis of the factors which had been outlined, he explained. Before they were through, there would probably be some role-playing, in which the most enthusiastic opponents of the city council's action would be asked to take the council's part, and maybe even a liturgical or homiletical design period, in which the subgroups would cooperate in preparing means of worshiping and celebrating Christian communion which took into full account the problematic situation. There might even be some mini-lectures by any facilitators present on how to improve social, therapeutic, or liturgical skills demonstrated during the course of the case study.

By this time I was so overwhelmed by the thoughts of such a total learning experience that I am afraid I had very little presence of mind for asking helpful questions.

I did inquire whether there was any connection between this case study method of education and the whole practice of field

work as we had known it when I was in seminary, to which my patient host replied that field work had long ago been abolished as a second-rate rival of this approach within the seminary itself. It was decided, he said, that the on-the-job experiences, often poorly supervised, lacked not only the concentrated intensity of the case studies but the important setting of collegiality as well, within which students would be stimulated and instructed by the display of their friends' imaginations and expertise. Whereas a student in a field-work situation might proceed through three or four major experiences a year, with only sporadic or uneven treatment in a seminar setting, he might reasonably have as many as sixty or seventy such experiences annually in the case studies program.

Briefs of the daily studies, I learned, were circulated among the students several days in advance of the public hearings, so that there was opportunity for research and reflection before actually becoming involved in the sessions themselves. The subjects for the studies ranged widely. Generally they had to do with parish response to such situations as the alarming consumption of sexual pornography by the young; the death of a nonbeliever; the divorce of a prominent parish couple; the defeat of a particularly worthy candidate for political office; the bombing of a small African city by UN containment troops; a devastating flood that had left thousands of tenement families homeless; public indifference to educational method; and subliminal patterns of prejudice on government television channels.

It was primarily for the case studies, which were constantly being changed and renewed, that most of the ministers and laymen returned to seminary once they had left. A month's worth of these sessions, declared by mentor, and they go back to their parishes like new persons!

Many of the case studies, I learned, were brought to the seminary by returning students. Some represented actual incidents which they had had to face in the line of duty. Others were the fruit of imagination and speculation which resulted when the students reflected on the relationship between various life situations and certain theological teachings or positions. All in all, it meant that there was little place in this modern seminary for purely abstract thought or belief. The religion inculcated there was a *commando* religion. Belief was constantly being challenged by real situations.

I could not but concede to my host that it was the most incomparable system I had ever encountered.

But did it mean, I asked, that students never entered upon church vocations during their seminary training? And, if it did,

how were their educational expenses defrayed? I remembered the high proportion of students in my day who had to work at some financially gainful employment in order to support themselves and their families.

"Oh, they may work in our local parishes," I was told, "and many in fact do. But not in any remunerative arrangement. They are supported on *a pro rata* basis, according to the size of their families and any other special needs, by the World Church Seminary Fund. It isn't a grand salary, by any means. Like military pay, it isn't enough to attract many persons not seriously interested in the style of life. But it is adequate, is given with no strings attached, and offers the freedom necessary for anyone to become a better servant of the church.

"While here, a person's primary commitment is to life as a student. Hence the student lives in common housing and receives a nominal allowance. Student families are even given special training for they will be engaged in the same problems and situations. Couples are expected to receive special marital therapy, and children too are exposed to carefully designed programs leading to fuller self-understanding and general awareness. Everything conceivable is done to assure a fuller life-style for those who will try to communicate such a style to other persons. It is all seen as part of the mission of the church."

I heard these last statements of my host with a somewhat troubled consciousness, for I had the feeling that the dream was coming to an end. I think he said other things which I wish I could recall, but the sense of interruption was predominant. It was as if I had been tuned into one radio wavelength, and another were beginning to gain the ascendancy over it.

With a desperate effort to hold on, I thanked my host for his extraordinary kindness to me, and assured him of my genuine pleasure in all that I had seen and heard. I did not hear what he said in reply. His lips moved, I am certain, but at this point the other wavelength took over completely.

I woke that morning to a day of remarkable luminosity, though with a sense of some disappointment that what I had witnessed had been only a dream. Later, after a light breakfast and an animated report to my family of what I had dreamed, I carried my heavy briefcase down the familiar old corridor of my seminary. Somehow what had been familiar now seemed strange to me. I thought of the video consoles and the happy, enthusiastic seminarians at work in the pleasant rooms of my nocturnal imaginings. Wistfully, I placed the briefcase by my desk and began to review a lecture I was scheduled to give at nine to a class of men and women who were counting the days until they were out of seminary and more or less permanently

settled in new jobs. Suddenly, even though it was early morning, I was tired. It would be a long day.

But someday—maybe—

THE CHAPLAINCY IN THE YEAR 2000

Richard G. Hutcheson, Jr., Ph.d.

The safest forecast one can make regarding the chaplaincy in the year 2000 AD is that it will have changed less than we expect. A Chaplain Van Winkle, vintage 1952, suddenly awakening in 1976, would require only a few days to adjust. Although he would be amazed at some of the things going on off-post, and at some aspects of the Army, he would find the continuity within the chaplaincy itself reassuring. He could fit comfortably into most elements of most chapel programs. Even the issues being discussed at weekly chaplain meetings would be remarkably similar to those of the early fifties when he fell asleep; he could enter some of the arguments with hardly a dropped analogy. We can confidently predict that today's chaplain would be equally at home in the chaplaincy 24 years in the future. This is not to deny the ubiquity of change in our society. The necessity of coping with constant and rapid change in the world of the late 20th century is too well known to be disputed. Yet armies and chaplaincies do remain relatively stable in such a changing environment. In basic ways, chaplain ministry is very much like it was a quarter-century ago, and the same is likely to be true a quarter-century in the future.

A second base line to be laid out as we prepare for a look at the chaplaincy in the year 2000 is a recognition that the most significant single source of change—the possibility of war—cannot be predicted. Armies exist to be prepared to wage war if necessary, and when that necessity arises, all bets are off. As World War II established the major parameters for today's armed forces, so another major worldwide conflict—a World War III—would bring forth a radically new situation, for the world and the nation as well as the armed forces. A localized war in the Near East or elsewhere would introduce significant new variables, as did the Korean and Vietnamese wars in the last quarter-century. Any rational futurologizing at this time must be based on an assumption that there will not be another global war, and on a recognition that future localized wars would significantly alter matters.

These two caveats aside, what changes can we expect the next quarter-century to bring to the military chaplaincy? A look at

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the future must start with the present. We begin by identifying those areas in which change is now taking place. Obviously, when our concern is the future of the chaplaincy, some of the changes in the *society* at large are more salient than others. Since the chaplain participates in two major social institutions, the *church* and the *army*, we can narrow the field to those changes having the greatest effect on these two institutions. We may then ask some questions that will enable us to take a rational look at what is likely to happen in the future. First, what is the *direction* of the change? Toward what goal does it seem to be taking us? Second, how *rapidly* is the change taking place? Third, what is the *outlook* regarding continued direction and speed? What factors seem likely to affect the future continuation of the trend? And finally, what *projection* can we make about the chaplaincy in the year 2000 AD, based on each trend? Using these procedures, a framework within which any group of chaplains can engage in its own futurology exercise (or check and take issue with the conclusions of this one) would look something like that shown below. The trends listed in the left-hand column, under "Areas of Change," are the ones to be examined in this article. Such lists, of course, might vary.

It is apparent that some current changes in the society at large are reflected significantly in both the church and the army. The changing role of women, for instance, has major implications for both institutions, and must be examined in all three categories.

While all the areas of change listed above will be looked at in the following discussion, some will receive more attention than others. Two, identified above as the trend toward social conservatism" and the "demythologizing of institutions," will be examined in some detail, as implications for the military, the churches, and the chaplaincy are traced in each case.

Trend Toward Social Conservatism

In the evaluative study of Army Chaplaincy programs conducted by the author in late 1974 and 1975, assumptions regarding the future were listed as the background against which assessments of specific programs were made. The first of the listed assumptions about American society was:

> As the trauma of Vietnam and the shock of the Watergate era continue to recede from the forefront of American consciousness, the society will be seeking 'normalcy.' Present trends indicate that this quest will take the same direction it has historically—a movement in the direction of social conservatism.

	AREAS OF CHANGE	DIRECTION OF CHANGE	RAPIDITY OF CHANGE	OUTLOOK FOR CONTINUATION	PROJECTION: CHAPLAINCY IN 2000 AD
SOCIETY	1. Trend toward social conservatism. 2. "Demythologizing" of institutions. 3. Role of minorities. 4. Role of women.				
CHURCH	1. Decline of "main-line" denominations. 2. New sects and cults. 3. Religious conservatism. 4. Role of women. 5. Increasing pluralism.				
MILITARY	1. Ascendency of traditionalism over human rights issues. 2. "Marketplace" recruiting: Unionization. 3. Role of women.				

Events in the intervening period have not only confirmed, but have strengthened the perception of a conservative trend in the nation. Politically, the turn taken by the 1976 primary election campaigns has been widely interpreted as reflecting a resurgent conservatism. Juridically, the Warren Supreme Court has been replaced by the Burger Court. The quiescent, career-oriented student generation of the late seventies is strikingly contrasted with the activist students of the late sixties.

Many commentators are agreed that the cyclical swing in the direction of personal libertarianism, with emphasis on the rights of individuals, reaction against traditional social values, espousal of value-systems emphasizing self-gratification, and optimism regarding human nature, probably reached its apogee at about the end of the sixties. The pendulum is now seen to be swinging in the other direction toward a more societally-oriented definition of liberties with emphasis on the rights of larger groups over against individuals, recovery of certain traditional values, and a less optimistic view of human nature. Public pornography has probably reached its outer limits and beginnings of a movement in the other direction can be discerned. Sexual license and experimentation with alternatives to monogomous marriage and nuclear families are beginning to decline. These trends will probably accelerate as the reality of the conservative tide is increasingly recognized and affirmed. The chaplaincy of 2000 AD will probably reflect a conservative rather than a libertarian and individually-oriented social climate.

As reflected in the armed forces, this social climate is likely to take the form of lessening attention to the rights, comforts, and gratifications of the individual soldier, and a deemphasis of "human goals" types of programs. Instead, the emphasis will be on the well-being of the larger group, on discipline and a recovery of traditional military values. The assumption of the author's 1975 study seems increasingly confirmed:

> This army will be marked by professionalism, with far less emphasis than in the past on crash programs to deal with massive social problems such as drug abuse, race tensions and dissidents. As the climate of professionalism becomes more pervasive, Army authorities will perceive it as less and less necessary to devote attention to 'people problems'.

The churches, as leading opinion makers, were among the early social institutions to reflect the conservative trend. While religious conservatism and social conservatism are by no means identical, they express similar dynamics. Critics may not agree on reasons as to *Why the Conservative Churches are Growing*,

but the book's title expresses an indisputable fact. As the 1975 chaplaincy study predicted:

> The liberal mainline's churches will continue to decline in members, while the conservative, evangelical churches will continue to grow. Within the liberal churches themselves, the trend will be away from the humanistic extremes of the sixties and early seventies, toward a recovery of transcendence (the recent much publicized 'Hartford Affirmations' point the direction of the future), coupled with continued social concern but without the social radicalism of the sixties. The liberal establishment as the voice of American religion is not dead, but conservative voices will continue to grow in strength and influence in those church structures dealing with the military.

Despite the trend toward social conservatism, it seems clear that certain social gains which have been associated with the personal-libertarian and human rights orientation of the past quarter-century, will not be reversed. Most prominent among these are the new status of minorities and women. With regard to minorities, the conceptual battle is won. The entitlement of blacks to full equality is firmly established. Ahead lies a period of consolidation of gains, marked by increasingly full acceptance and "normalization" of minority equality.

The future for women in society is less a settled issue. The extremes of the feminist movement have already receded. The ultimate adoption of the Equal Rights Amendment (significance of which has been largely symbolic) seems increasingly in doubt. The traditional role of women as homemakers is not likely to be seriously undermined. However, the opening up of alternative roles, and full equality with men for those women who choose such alternative roles, is not likely to be reversed. This fact has significant implications for the military and the chaplaincy, which we will note a little later.

"Demythologizing" of Institutions

One would expect a swing of the pendulum toward social conservativism to bring with it a heightened respect for traditional social institutions—government, church, business, the educational establishment, union, and the armed forces. Ultimately this may turn out to be the case, and the conservative trend may in part reflect an unconscious longing for a basis on which confidence in such institutions can be restored. For the immediate future, however, such institutions will continue to be viewed with few illusions and with considerable skepticism.

From the perspective of military chaplains, the effect on the two major institutions they represent—the church and the armed forces—is of overwhelming importance. There is some evidence that both enjoy an improving public image. Of inestimable long-range significance, however, is one aspect of institutional demythologizing which is bringing about a major change in the basic way military service is defined and understood by the American people.

Historically, military service has not been regarded by Americans as a "job" comparable to any other kind of vocational activity. The dominant image out of the past was that of the citizen-soldier, volunteering or being involuntarily mobilized for national emergencies. The military environment embraced the whole of life and the Army was a "total institution." Since military service was civic obligation, pay was low. The obligation of a grateful nation to take care of its defenders, however, led to a large number of "benefits." The small nucleus of professionals, maintained between emergencies, was compensated for low pay and the hazardous nature of the calling by a wide range of fringe benefits, covering nearly every necessity of life—commissaries, post exchanges, complete medical care, recreational facilities, generous retirement provisions, even spiritual nurture from chaplains, all of which were in keeping with the "total institution" concept. In return for the shelter of this paternalistic umbrella, far more complete than the kind of protection accompanying any normal "job," the professional soldier was glad to forego the other side of the "job" equation: the personal rights of acceptance or rejection, a measure of control over work conditions, and the right to bargain over compensation.

The enormous post-World War II expansion of the size of permanent standing armed forces brought successive increases in military compensation to levels approaching comparability with civilian jobs. But there was no basic change in philosophy, since the system was buttressed by a draft, based on a theory that a period of national service was "owed" by all young men. Military service remained a special vocational category, distinct from ordinary jobs, with members foregoing personal control in exchange for a total life style and an umbrella of benefits.

The end of the draft, in response to public clamor during the highly unpopular Vietnamese War, coupled with the onset of the all-volunteer army, brought, however, a basic change in the rationale for military service. The absence of any statutory obligation, along with the absence of any feeling of personal obligation to sacrifice or to serve (which characterized the self-gratification ethic of the sixties and the early seventies) has left

the armed forces with no alternative but to bid for "job-seekers" in the economic marketplace. Pay has been tied to average civilian scales. While military pay is nowhere near the levels paid by those private companies that send personnel to "hardship" areas overseas or place them in hazardous situations, remaining "benefits" have provided the additional incentives needed to keep quotas reasonably well filled. High unemployment levels in a recessionary economy (and continuing even into the recovery period) have, of course, helped.

The cost, however, has been enormous. Attempts have been made to save money by whittling away at the umbrella of benefits. Commissaries barely survive after a series of narrow escapes. Along with post exchanges, they appear to be headed for extinction. A new contributory retirement system, with savings clauses to protect those presently involved, but with greatly reduced benefits in the long run, has strong political support. Medical care is continually eroded, especially for the retired. A total compensation concept that computes cash value for all benefits—even recreational facilities, in some versions—and aims at substituting cash compensation for benefits in the future, is in the offing. At the same time, personal libertarianism has whittled away at the "total institution" concept. The end result is likely to be the final demise of the old "national service" pattern and a changeover to marketplace recruiting in which military employment is regarded as nothing more than a job, competing economically for the work-time of job-seekers.

Assuming that this trend continues, the probable outcome will be unionization of the armed forces. As one of the most hotly-debated issues presently facing the military, the future of military unionization cannot be predicted with any degree of confidence. The outcome, however, is not likely to be determined by the horrified opposition of senior officers and NCOs, by debate on its inherent merits in the pages of *Army Times*, or resolutions sponsored by large numbers of senators. Unions are too respectable and too well established as American social institutions to accept passively the "bogeyman" label. The outcome depends, rather, on whether the present trend toward transforming military service into just another job, competing for personnel in the marketplace, is continued. Without that traditional umbrella of protective benefits, military people are not likely to continue indefinitely foregoing the widely-recognized right of job-holders to engage in some form of negotiation on job conditions and compensation, through collective bargaining. On balance, the present judgment would have to be that the trend *is* likely to continue, and that a unionized Army will probably be the pattern of 2000 AD.

The improved status of minorities and women was noted above. The armed forces and the churches have been institutions particularly affected by these gains. Racial quotas, whether affirmative or negative, will not be a factor in the military of the future. Open recruiting and for-the-most-part genuine equal opportunity will lead to continued high levels of minority participation, and to increasing numbers of blacks at higher rank levels. A continued movement toward full equality for women who choose non-traditional roles may also be expected. In the armed forces, this will probably lead to removal, before the end of the century, of the legal bars which now prevent women from serving in combat roles. By 2000 AD women are likely to be fully integrated in every occupational and combat speciality.

Nowhere has the feminist movement had a greater impact than in the churches. It is entirely possible, given the traditionally higher level of participation in religious activities by women than by men, together with the rapidly expanding church leadership opportunities for women, that female leadership may become dominant in some denominations by 2000 AD. The most striking evidence of things to come is to be seen in seminary enrollment, with some denominational seminaries reporting that women comprise up to one-third of their entering classes, and up to one-half in some interdenominational seminaries. The expected number of woman graduates probably cannot be absorbed by civilian churches, and with increasingly open military officer procurement policies, the number of women entering the chaplaincy is likely to increase rapidly.

The decline of the "mainline" liberal churches and the increasing conservatism of American religious life have been mentioned earlier. Another significant trend is the proliferation of new sects and cults on the religious scene. New Christian or quasi-Christian sects tend to be ultraconservative. Some cults formerly regarded as "fringe groups" are following the classic pattern of institutionalization and movement toward the religious mainstream. Particularly striking are the non Judeo-Christian religions currently taking this path, including the Black Muslim movement, which is now reaching out for broader recognition and acceptance. Buddhist movements in Hawaii and the west coast are also moving toward recognition as part of the mainstream (witness the recent inclusion of Buddhists in California state legislature prayer formalities in those regions.

The trend toward conservatism and the proliferation of cults will not significantly affect civil religion ceremonies, which are generally supported by conservative groups. Conservatives are

less inclined toward a homogenized "ecumenical" religion, however, and the long-range result of conservative ascendency, coupled with the growth of cults and sects, is likely to be greater pluralism in religious practice.

Emerging Picture of the Chaplaincy

The emerging picture of the military chaplaincy of 2000 AD, which may be summarized on the basis of projections from the foregoing trends, is something like the following. The composition of the chaplaincy will be more pluralistic, with less domination by the liberal establishment and greater representation from the evangelical churches, including newer sects. It will no longer be solely Judeo-Christian. A few chaplains from formerly "fringe" religions such as Buddhist sects and the Black Muslims, will probably be included. There will be far more female chaplains—probably up to one-third in the lower grades—by the end of the century.

The ministry, too, will be more pluralistic, with fewer Army-wide programs based on a liberal consensus. There will have been some movement away from ministries aimed at human development and potential, in the direction of more traditional and "spiritual" ministries, but a thorough-going and self-conscious pluralism will allow for optional human growth-centered ministries.

The ministerial environment will be a military community with more minority persons in the upper ranks, and with far more woman soldiers, integrated into combat as well as non-combatant specialties. Unionization, with a limited kind of collective bargaining replacing the paternalism of earlier patterns, is likely to make for a military service which is far less a "total institution" than at present. This trend will have been balanced to some extent, however, by stronger demands from the military establishment for on-the-job discipline and professionalism. Such a new context will offer 21st century chaplains enlarged opportunities for reconciling and bridge-building ministries, along with their traditional duties.

Yet, "the more things change, the more they remain the same." When all these trends are projected into the future, the fact remains that basically the chaplain's ministry will be similar to that of the present. Continuity is still the most significant factor. A 1976 Chaplain Van Winkle awakening in the year 2000 AD, would adjust quite readily.

NONVIOLENT SOURCES OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR TOMORROW

Martin L. Smith

Reflecting on our history:

Britain has just won the most costly war in recorded history against France. A war debt in excess of L140 million exists. Lord George Grenville, the new Prime Minister, is faced with the problem of paying off the war debt. In 1763 the average Englishmen paid 26 shillings a year in tax. To burden Englishmen with an additional tax would be politically unwise.

Taxes in the North American colonies approximate from 5 pence to 1 shilling per year. Of the war debt, at least L30 million has been spent in the colonies. In addition, at the request of the colonists 10,000 British troops are being maintained, at a cost of L220,000 a year, in the colonies for their protection from the native Americans.

In an effort to help balance the British budget in relation to the costs incurred through maintaining the North American colonies a series of Acts have been issued in 1764-65. These include: the Sugar Act which lowers the tax on sugar from 6 pence to 3 pence per pound but requires payment by the colonists in gold or silver coinage; the Quartering Act which requires colonists to house British troops when inadequate space exist in the barracks; and the Stamp Act intended to raise revenue by requiring certain documents to bear official stamps.

To the British Parliament these measures seem quite reasonable. In the original charters granted to the colonists Parliment had the right to tax. The British government has spent large sums defending the colonies from the French and the native Americans. But in the colonies they cause a major controversy. The colonists perceive these Acts as intrusion upon their freedom. For the past 150 years the colonists had not been subjected to direct British taxation. The British monarchy preoccupied with other problems had never developed a tight administration of the colonies. During this period of benign neglect, the colonists had developed their own alternative governments. These governments were broadly based representative forums. These forums were so effective that John Adams wrote ... that the revolution was complete in the minds of the people and the Union of the colonies before the war commenced in the skir-

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mishes of Concord and Lexington on the 19th of April, 1775. The colonists and the British government had a classic conflict: the British felt that they had a legal right to tax while the colonists felt that Britain was unfairly taxing without granting representation..

In such a conflict there seems to be four choices: *to respond with a threat of force; to accept the will of the adversary; to reach an accommodation; to undermine the adversary through the tactics of nonviolent struggle.* The first option has the danger that the threat of force might actually need to be applied. Thus, nations have repeatedly gone to war. War is costly in both human and material terms. The second option implies possibly accepting tyranny. You are unwilling to take a stand against oppression. This third method requires working out mutually acceptable terms. This can be very difficult. Communication and a sense of trust in the adversary are usually essential. Seven methods of accommodation have been found to be effective in conflict resolution: cooperation, compromise, changing goals or values, stalemate or truce, withdrawal, legal or legislative settlement, and arbitration or award. The fourth method, probably the least understood, involves wielding power through a nonviolent campaign. Nonviolent campaigns include familiar techniques like: strikes, boycotts, slow downs, fasting, picketing, noncooperation and sit-ins.

In particular, the Stamp Act caused an uproar. The actions taken by the colonists were unprecedented. In retrospect, it seems that the colonists had four options:

1. to threaten armed resistance in opposition to the tax;
2. to accept the new tax and pay their share of the war debt;
3. to accept the tax but protest since Parliament should not raise revenue in the colonies;
4. to refuse the tax as unjustified.

As you are well aware, the colonists decided to refuse payment of the tax. Refusing payment was a radical action. People often object to governmental taxation but seldom do more than complain. It must be remembered that the idea of Independence was just beginning to be voiced by a small group of extremists.

Although colonial resistence ot the Stamp Act was marred by numerous examples of mob action, it was significantly a nonviolent campaign of economic resistance and refusal to use stamps. Not a single death is recorded through their violent protest.

In a pamphlet written by Daniel Dulany in October of 1765, on resistance to the Stamp Act, he said, "Instead of moping and whining to excite compassion, in such a situation we ought with spirit and vigor and alacrity to bid defiance to tyranny by expos-

ing its impotence, by making it as contemptible as it would be detestable." [1] The colonists acted in such as way as to undermine Lord Grenville's authority.

How does a group undermine authority by nonviolent action? One form of nonviolent action is noncooperation. Under the Stamp Act, stamps were required on all legal documents. When the colonists refused to use the stamps, one question became whether the courts should remain open. George Washington displayed a sophisticated understanding of nonviolent strategy by reasoning: You close the courts, because if you close the courts, the courts cannot be used in an effort to collect the money which the colonists are refusing. Thus, the English merchants, who want their money, pressure Parliament for repeal of the tax.

Through a series of nonviolent campaigns primarily nonimportation and noncompliance the colonists undermined the most powerful government in Europe. The Stamp Act was repealed by the English Parliment, Lord Grenville's government failed, and Parliament reassesed its colonial policy.

Lost to the mythology of the shot that was heard around the world is a vast disregarded history of the use of nonviolent forms of struggle by the American colonists against English controls. In the period between 1765 and 1775 the colonists conducted three separate campaigns which displayed sophisticated understanding of the techniques of nonviolent struggle. These campaigns were primarily focused on British taxation policies which were considered unjust by the colonists. It was through these programs that self-government in the Colonies matured and the idea of Independence became a reality.

I raised the issue of nonviolent struggle in the colonial era not to refute what you learned in high school but rather to challenge your thinking on alternatives to armed struggle. Historically, war has played an important function in international relations. As General Karl von Clausewitz so aptly stated: "War is politics by other means." Today we must seek war by other means. The advent of nuclear weapons which endanger not only an adversary but the entire human species has made international war increasingly dysfunctional. Ironically, the technological improvements, ad infinitum, in destructive capability have done little to improve security.

To an outsider, it seems apparent that the military establishment needs to consider alternative methods for resolving conflict. Awareness of the need for research on alternatives to armed conflict is growing. In a report, Richard Falk a member of the United States team of the World Order Models Project, a transnational group of scholars projecting future world needs, succinctly stated:

> So long as power is maintained by violence, it will be challenged by violence. In this sense, the displacement of collective violence in human affairs involves a comprehensive, although gradual and not necessarily total, substitution of modes of mediation, compromise, and persuasion, as well as a growing appreciation of the greater utility of nonviolent techniques of control and transformation.[2]

Nowhere does a blueprint presently exist for an effective alternative to the function of warfare and the present military establishment. An institute should be established, with adequate funds and personnel, to research alternative methods for resolving conflict without the use of armed force. The military should be at the forefront in support of such research.

An example of an alternative to armed struggle is nonviolent struggle. Resistance to the Stamp Act in 1765 was a nonviolent struggle. Nonviolent struggle is quite distinct from being passive and praying that evil will disappear. It is based upon the simple idea that the exercise of power depends on the consent of the ruled.[3] No government, whether democratic or totalitarian, can effectively operate without the support of the people. People have the capability to withdraw their consent and thus undermine authority. Through noncooperation people can make a government ineffective. Nonviolent struggle is not easy. It requires discipline and the capacity to bear hardship. From the limited historical research which has been done, we know that nonviolent campaigns have been effectively waged against dictators and tyrants. Records show the Plebeians in 494 BC conducted a successful nonviolent campaign.

Nonviolent struggle is a strategy, which offers promise of tactical success in undermining an adversary. Its mode of operation is such that violence to individuals and property are limited. Yet, just another strategy or tactic for waging war is not enough. Serious research on conflict resolution is needed: a clear, more cogent understanding about what conflict is; of how conflicts evolve and escalate into violence; and of what methods exist for resolving conflict without resorting to violence. Although not entirely analogous, the methods by which individuals handle personal conflict might help broaden our understanding of the way in which international conflict is managed.

In my own work with the Schools Program of the New York office of the American Friends Service Committee I have found that people often have distorted perceptions of conflict. They equate conflict with violence:

CONFLICT = AGGRESSION = VIOLENCE = DESTRUCTION

Conflict is perceived as what appears nightly on the TV.[4] People do not realize that conflict can be either socially useful (functional) or harmful (dysfunctional).

Through systematic study conflict might be demystifyed. Educational programs can delineate methods that aid the functional resolution of conflict. We need to:

—accept conflict as a natural and normal aspect of life;
—realize that conflict can be avoided, but at the risk of ignoring underlying tensions and frustrations;
—understand that, while violence may have served certain functions throughout history, modern weaponry and global interdependence make resorting to violence increasingly dysfunctional;
—understand that violence can lead to social change, but that this does not make it the best way or the only way;
—recognize that our basic social institutions while far from perfect, offer countless ways of expressing and resolving conflicts.[5]

Education may provide a vehicle for individuals to realize that conflict is related to, but not synonymous with violence and aggression; in fact, most human conflicts are resolved without violence.

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1. Daniel Dulany, "Considerations upon the Rights of the British Colonists to the Privileges of British Subjects" (New York, 1766) p. 47.
2. Richard Falk, *Study of Future Worlds* (New York, 1975) pp. 155–56.
3. See Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (Boston, 1973).
4. According to a special KPIX-TV San Francisco May 10–12, 1975 report, the average child witnesses an estimated 18,000 TV deaths a year.
5. David C. King, *Patterns of Human Conflict* (New York, 1974) p. 14.

The following is a suggested list of starter books containing specific exercises or information related to the development of a better understanding of conflict resolution.

Conflict and Communication, by John Burton (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969) details an experiment carried out between two warring states (Indonesia and Malaysia) using controlled communication as one technique for dispute settlement.

Conflict Regulation, by Paul Wehr (Washington DC: American Association for the Advancement of Society, 1976) presents an overview of different approaches to conflict analysis.

Conflict: Violence & Nonviolence, edited by Joan U. Bondurant (New York: Atherton, 1973). Essays on conflict resolution.

Creating the Future, by Charles Beitz and Michael Washburn (New York: Bantam 1974) is a guide for living and working for social change which includes a survey of current social change movements with names and addresses of specific organizations.

"The Ethics of Social Intervention: Community Crisis Intervention Program", by James Laue and Gerald Cormick (St. Louis, Missouri: Community Crisis Intervention Center, Washington University, 1973) presents premises and techniques for crisis intervention, including empowerment of the weaker party for more effective negotiations.

The Handbook of Structured Exercises for Human Relations Training, Vol. 1–5, by J. William Pfeiffer and John E. Jones, eds. (University Associates, 1975) offers five volumes of exercises designed to develop specific human relations skills.

International Conflict for Beginners, by Roger Fisher (New York: Harper and Row, 1970) provides a useful system for analyzing conflict at the international level.

Lateral Thinking, by Edward de Bono (New York: Harper and Row, 1970) contains structured activities for developing creative thinking.

The Miracle of Being Awake, by Thich Nhat Hahn (Nyack, NY: Fellowship Books, 1975) is a manual on meditation for activists by the leader of the Vietnamese Buddhist delegation in Paris.

Parent Effectiveness Training, by Thomas Gordon (New York: Wyden Press, 1970) suggests ways to resolve family conflicts including active listening, modification of environment and enlarging areas of acceptable behavior.

Politics of Nonviolent Action, The, by Gene Sharp (Boston: Porter Sargent Publishers, 1973) offers a comprehensive history of nonviolent struggle. An excellent piece of research.

Reality Games, by Saville Sax and Sandra Hollander (New York: Macmillan, 1972) contains interaction and communication exercises which can be applied to conflict resolution situations.

Reducing Social Tension and Conflict Through the Group Conversation Method, by Rachel D. Dubois and Meu Soong Li (New York: Association Press, 1971)

Sociology of Social Conflicts, The, by Louis Kriesberg (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1973)

ARCHITECTS OF THE THIRD CENTURY

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> The imperative of the present is to integrate the struggle for greater humanization. To be more fully human is to share life, to respond to the dignity of ourselves and others, to be committed to the growth of one another, to develop and vitalize human community.
>
> Preamble, Declaration of Interdependence.

PART ONE

The patriots assembled in Philadelphia two hundred years ago were equally concerned with the exigencies of their immediate political struggle and the vision of a free society thriving on our landscape without the fetters of arbitrary power. In their message of national self-determination, the tyranny of the British Crown was denounced and a glimpse into this new and democratic society was offered. The Declaration of Independence continues to provide a theory of human liberation as revolutionary in content today as it was in consequence in 1776. Since the time of Abigail Adams, women have embraced the promise of this historic document and puzzled over its applicability to them. Their struggle for social and political equality has been infused with the founder's zest for freedom, investing their cause with the same belief in the power of solidarity to move human events.

Despite the obscurity of much political history about women in the United States, American feminism has had a continuous record of outrage and courage in the face of social and legal disability. A veritable chorus of women, over the many decades, has rung out in support of their entitlement to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." Recently, the leadership of eleven women's organizations met in the historic city of our nation's birth, Philadelphia, to review the question of women's role in the commemoration of the bicentennial. The consensus was reached that such a celebration, where half the population remained outside of the social and political life of the nation as equal partners, was not an occasion of retrospective satisfac-

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tion. Understanding the American Revolution as a symbol of continuing struggle, a revolution which continues into the future, provided the basis for a new association, the Women's Coalition for the Third Century. With the conviction that women are responsible for creating the goals of national life, the new association appropriated the task of proclaiming the values and visions for a third century. These "architects" of the future drafted a *Declaration of Interdependence* which redefines our relationships to one another and incorporates the shortcomings and imperatives of the past and present. It will be officially proclaimed on the Fourth of July this year in Washington.

This reformulation of priority—from independence to interdependence—presents a view of history where events and visions are perceived as interconnected realities. The present is no more disengaged from the past than the future from our skills and ability to control what's to come. Insistent on the imperative to adapt our thinking and practices in relation to the changes of technology and communication innovation, the women weigh the resilience of traditional values in the context of an emerging global society. They reject national sovereignty and individuality as illusory models and impracticable modes of life in the coming decades. The eighteenth century attachment to an idea of liberty which fostered separation from—another political power, social networks—has become untenable and is giving way to an orientation infused with the spirit of continuity and commonality of experience. Although the men of the American Revolution pledged their lives and fortunes in defense of sovereignty, their strictures against oppression and domination give vitality to the contemporary movement toward international community.

The possibility of an interdependent future society, born of the free partnership of men and women sharing their mutual visions and goals, depends upon an informed citizenship. Until women's history is retrieved from its shadow-like place, only half the story of our common past can be told. It is ironic that so little is known about the previous dissents of women activists in the context of the history of national proclamations of right. Twice in the nineteenth century, women drafted Declarations and one was dramatically presented at our national centennial in 1876.

The Centennial Protest.[1]

The centennial marked twenty eight years of unceasing and frustrating campaigning for the improvement of women's position by the early feminist activists. Neither law nor society had

[1] All of the following discussion is derived from Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony and Matilda J. Gage, Eds., *History of Woman Suffrage*, Vol. 1.

yielded to the fervor of these women in spite of their protestations and educational efforts. The decades of political schism over slavery and the Civil War, which converted the nation into a divided armed camp, had undermined the women's movement, drawing the attention and energy of the American people away from the "woman's question". Now that the nation was preparing for its 100th birthday, having survived the division, legislated against slavery and mandated universal *manhood* suffrage, the leadership seized the opportunity to reinstate the claims to women's rights. It was symbolically appropriate to redress the government for having passed the 15th Amendment which excluded women from the vote, just as the framers of the American nation had renounced the British government for its obstruction of civil justice.

The women's movement made use of the founding experience in other ways. On the occasion of its inception in 1848 in Seneca Falls, New York, the women had adapted the text of the Declaration of Independence to their grievances and demands and circulated the woman's Declaration of Sentiments as a platform and strategy for support and legislative relief. Several of the more courageous members had refused to be taxed "without representation" and suffered the loss of personal property as a consequence. In the call to the 9th annual convention of the National Woman Suffrage Association, the President reminded the membership that the centennial discussion of republican principles was important to women. She wrote:

> Liberty to-day is, therefore, but the heritage of one-half the people, and the centennial will be but the celebration of the independence of one-half the nation. The men alone of this country live in a republic, the women enter the second hundred years of national life as political slaves. [2]

This sentiment was affirmed in a resolution passed at the convention which took note of the fact that the women of 1876 have greater reason for "discontent, rebellion and revolution" than the patriots of 1776.

The feminists, having resolved to protest against the "celebration of independence", decided to organize a counter-celebration in Philadelphia which would create greater solidarity among the disenfranchised women and demonstrate the vitality of the movement. Although the women encountered an initial difficulty because as married women they could not contract for the rental of headquarters in the historic city, this reminder of the legal inequity between the sexes only enhanced

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

their commitment to stage a dramatic demonstration on the Fourth of July. The rooms were finally rented by Susan B. Anthony, a single woman, and the work, which included the drafting of a new proclamation of rights, was feverishly underway.

The executive committee of the National Woman Suffrage Association attempted to secure a place on the official centennial program but their request was denied. Reasoning that the government's denial was consistent with its long history of excluding women's presence in political life, they remained unperturbed and managed to obtain five press invitations to the gala event held in Independence Hall. On the day of the festivities, directly after the solemn reading of the Declaration of Independence, Susan B. Anthony led the small group of women to the platform where they presented a copy of their declaration to the shaken vice-president, Thomas Ferry. Hastily scattering copies of the document throughout the auditorium, the women exited and reconvened among a large crowd of spectators in front of the Liberty Bell. There, the text of the woman's Declaration of Rights was read aloud by Susan B. Anthony.

Although the Woman's Coalition for a Third Century has drafted a bicentennial declaration disclaiming the relevance of independence as a unifying principle, the women of 1876 seized upon its promise of self-government. Both feminist groups identify their impatience with their respective civil exclusion: the Coalition, in a list of imperatives; the 19th century Association, in their "articles of impeachment". The earlier feminists declared that they had been deprived of the same basic rights which had been the source of the revolutionary disavowal by our national fathers of colonial dominance. Unequal codes of law, disenfranchisement, taxation without representation were among the charges leveled against the federal and state governments. Affirming the right to a full and complete opportunity to participate and grow, the Declaration of Rights concludes with this appeal:

> We ask of our rulers, at this hour, no special favors, no special privileges, no special legislation. We ask justice, we ask equality, we ask that all the civil and political rights that belong to citizens of the United States, be guaranteed to us and our daughters forever.[3]

On that Fourth of July 1876, the women's counter-celebration adjourned to the First Unitarian Church where the audience listened with unabated enthusiasm to speeches interpreting the text of the Declaration of Rights, testimonies and sympathetic

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 34.

messages from supporters throughout the land. The mood was high when the ceremony came to a conclusion with the singing of a 19th century utopian song. A stanza from "A Hundred Years Hence" provides a taste of the cheerful rally's vision of the world in 1976:

> Then woman, man's partner, man's equal shall stand,
> While beauty and harmony govern the land, To think
> for oneself will be no offense, The world will be thinking
> *a hundred years hence.*[4]

A Human Link

Almost a half century passed between the centennial and the ratification of women's suffrage in 1920; another fifty years, before the campaign was launched for national acceptance of the Equal Rights Amendment. In light of this passage of time, the endurance of the feminist commitment to feasible change is surely remarkable. Among the women of the earlier generation of feminism was one whom we see as a veritable human link between that first effort and the 20th century movement. Charlotte Perkins Gilman was only an adolescent at the time of the centennial but before her thirtieth birthday she had begun a career which was to win her acclaim among her contemporaries of the women's movement. Author of more than twenty feminist books, including the translation of her best known work—*Women and Economics* (1898)—into seven languages, this distant relative of the Beecher family lived and wrote into the third decade of our century.

Charlotte Gilman described herself as a sociologist, a student of social evolution, but we claim her today as a visionary who looked beyond her circumstances into a future which goes beyond this generation's reality. In that time to come, which she perceived as inevitable, society would be equitable, balanced and healthy. Men, women and children would be related to one another without the onus of power and role-fixity. Her perspective on family life, individual and social health, nutrition, childcare and urban planning provides a rich source for those of us in quest of plans and visions for the immediate future.

The prolific writing of Gilman, including the sole responsibility for the publication of a monthly woman's journal (*The Forerunner*, 1909–1917) which she wrote, edited and distributed without assistance, trace a movement away from the patriarchal home to an open association of intelligent, engrossed people. From the Victorian scene of domestic dependence to a globally interdependent and responsible society, we see women emerge

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 39.

as equal participants in a dynamic and creative community. A brief sketch of this development follows:

A) Dependency as sickness.

Perhaps the most harrowing account of woman's symbolic confinement is narrated in the novella, *The Yellow Wallpaper* (1899), a story (partly autobiographical) about the psychological deterioration of a middle-class wife/mother. The metaphor of entrapment is presented in the heroine's obsession with the bedroom wallpaper which gradually becomes entangled with her reality. To Gilman, the stultifying atmosphere of the Victorian home leads to the destruction of family life. In place of genuine care and affection, the spontaneous expression of interconnection gives way to robot-like exchange between persons living under the same roof.

B) Independence as health.

Gilman's relentless critique of the home, a view that Americans idolized an unhealthy arrangement based upon the fastidious division and separation of social roles, appears in all her works. Reiterating the frailties of the "sexuo-economic function", which claimed woman as wife-mother and man as breadwinner and sole support, this ingenuous writer pointed to the myth of natural skills and proclivities. The wife-mother is seen as one who frets over satisfying the whims of husband and child, without the knowledge or experience to choose wisely. A life involved with the gratification of others cannot result in self-satisfaction or personal accomplishment. John Kenneth Galbraith's recent remarks about woman as "cryto-servant" (*Economics & the Public Purpose*, 1973) echo Gilman's concern about consumerism as a life-role. Only with education and the opportunity to participate as a creative member of society, through meaningful work, will women prove the value of social sharing of work/home roles.

C) Collaboration as social good.

Among the visions of Gilman are city condominiums where men, women and children interact with spontaneity and support. Parenting of the young was seen to be as much a professional function as medicine and law. The home would be "kitchenless", and all food preparation and enjoyment would be shared by the community. In *Herland* (1915), a utopian fantasy where sisters live in warm and tender relationship, Gilman forecasts a time when the social objectives of peace and love will be a reality. Perhaps her projection is not to be in the third century, but the cooperative and energetic association of equals is emerging today.

Women of the Third Century

In projecting the situation of woman in the third century we are not claiming clairvoyant powers for peering deeply into that future nor are we assuming the posture of the futurist who envisions living in tetrahedrons in interstellar space. We are instead taking the more moderate position of projecting into the future on the basis of trends already with us. Many of those trends which are now emerging into reality are the fruition of dreams and visions held by women of this nation writing one hundred and two hundred years ago. From the perspective of history we learn that society has been slow to incorporate these visions of change imagined by women writers from the beginnings of this country to the present time. However, we are beginning to see some of these societal changes around us and on the basis of these trends for change we can make some predictions for the future.

Impact of Contemporary Women's Movement

There are those who affirm that *the* trend, the major sociocultural factor presently taking place in our society is the contemporary women's movement. It is seen to be that catalyst which absorbs the economic-politico-ideological realities of the present and spells out the future.[1] The women's movement has taken root in the lives of women everywhere in this country and worldwide. Women of all ages, of all situations of race and class, find that they have new options and opportunities. Those of us with a historical perspective see that the hopes and visions of one hundred years ago, of two hundred years ago, are more and more descriptive of the lives we live in contemporary society. We do not see an apocalypse in which the old has passed away and the new has come, rather we see a society that has changed and changed in large measure because women have begun to perceive themselves differently; they see themselves as if reflected from a new set of mirrors. And, more importantly, women have begun to act on these new perceptions of themselves. As they have acted societal changes have begun to occur. Legislation and public pressure have begun to weaken old stereotypes, new forms of life and work are developing.

Charlotte Perkins Gilman's Visionary Hopes as Instructive for Present and Future

As we have previously noted, Charlotte Perkins Gilman's significant work, *Women and the Economy*, is an example of an

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[1] Karp, Lila and Mandis, Renos, "Genderless Sexuality: A Male-Female Psychological Exploration of the Future of Sexual Relationships," *Women in the Year 2000*, Maggie Tripp, ed. New York, Arbor House, 1974.

earlier treatise which informs us with directions for the present and for the future. Gilman saw that women restricted to the confines of home and certain limited social activities and economically dependent upon men were not only excluded from productive life and confined to the life of the consumer but by being excluded from the working world were limited in matters of mind and spirit.

> Her restricted impression, her confinement to the four walls of the home, have done great execution, of course, in limiting her ideas, her information, her thought processes, and power of judgment; and in giving a disproportionate prominence and intensity to the few things she knows about. . .[2]

Woman's world was a private world, made private by the rising socio-economic system of the industrial revolution which produced a radical demarcation between men's work and woman's work. In the colonial period women were an indispensable part of the unit of production, participating in a public life. In the nineteenth century women became consumers rather that producers, living an essentially private life. Gilman in describing the situation of the nineteenth century woman says:

> . . . in the ever-growing human impulse to create, the power and will to make, to do, to express one's new spirit in new forms, here she has been utterly debarred. She might work as she had worked from the beginning, at the primitive labors of the household; but in the inevitable expansion of even those industries to professional levels we have striven to hold her back. To work with her own hands, for nothing, in direct body-service to her own family this has been permitted, yes, compelled. But to be and do anything further from this she has been forbidden. Her labor has not only been limited in kind, but in degree. Whatever she has been allowed to do must be done in private and alone . . .[3]

Elizabeth Janeway in her work, *Man's World, Woman's Place*, has noted that women in the labor market, even in limited jobs, do have real advantages over women at home. They have a kind of participation in work, even hard, dull work, and the control over their lives which women feel when they join up with the working majority of human beings.[4]

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[2] Gilman, Charlotte Perkins, "Women and Economics," *The Feminist Papers, From Adams to de Beauvoir*, Alice S. Rossi, ed. New York, Bantam Books, 1974, p. 580.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] Janeway, Elizabeth, *Man's World, Woman's Place: A Study in Social Mythology.* New York, William Morrow and Company, 1971, p. 179.

In speaking to the question "Where are women going?" most women will tell you that they are going to work.

> That is the most obvious and available solution to the dreadful emptiness of having nothing to do, of feeling that you have never developed your own unique identity, of believing that you are not really worthy of esteem . . . it attests to the inability of the traditional feminine role to gratify some large sector of the female population . . . it is also evidence of the greater value that many women give to successful, individual, competitive achievement than to nurturant, supportive, traditional responsibilities.[5]

A woman at work is an independent adult human being operating in a public way taking responsibility for her action. This is the hope expressed by Gilman in her vision of the economically independent woman.

Women at Work

Most women work because they have to and for the same reason that men work, they need the income. Every year more women are entering the labor force; the most rapidly growing segment of women at work are mothers of young children. In 1970 the mothers of twenty-six million children under eighteen years of age were in the work force; almost six million of these children were under six years. One-third of all mothers with at least one child under six were in the labor force, as were about half the mothers of older children.[6] There are perhaps two major trends that account for the rise of working mothers of young children. The first is the fact that the fastest growing family unit America is the single parent family with the single parent most often being the mother. The second is that in an inflationary economy it is increasingly necessary for both parents to work in order to maintain an accustomed standard of living.

Sex-typed Employment

As women are entering the labor force they are entering it, and most often staying in it, at the lowest level positions. Occupational segregation by sex has changed very little during the past two decades. Women first entered the labor force in dramtic numbers between 1880 and 1920 when the Eastern and

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[5] Bardwick, Judith, "Androgyny and Humanistic Goal, or Goody, Cardboard People," *The American Woman: Who Will She Be?* Mary Louis McBee and Kathryn A. Blake, eds. Beverly Hills, CA, Glencoe Press, 1974.

[6] Kreps, Juanita M., "The Occupations: Wider Economic Opportunity," *The American Woman: Who Will She Be?* Mary Louise McBee and Kathryn A. Blake, eds. Beverly Hills, CA, Glencoe Press, 1974.

Southern European immigrants arrived on America's shores. Most of the immigrants, being poor and unskilled, found that survival hinged on putting the entire family to work. As more and more women took jobs in garment factories, canneries, and laundries, the female labor force showed the sharpest upturn of any period prior to 1940.[7] The women were at the lowest echelons of employment. These were the women who went to work out of sheer necessity for survival and were not the middle class nineteenth century women of whom Gilman speaks. As middle class women joined working class women at work they too entered—and stayed—at these same low levels of employment.

The breaking up of labor markets into male and female jobs has been credited with a large part of the growth in women's labor force participation during the past two decades. Women are still represented in a very narrow range of careers. In 1970 two-thirds of all women workers were employed as clerical, service and sales workers, or as domestic servants.[8] Clerical occupations provide jobs for one-third of all female employees and service jobs take another 22 percent. Women have lost ground in the professional and technical areas in recent decades. Within the professional area women's proportion of specific jobs which they have traditionally held has also declined. Women represented 28 percent of the faculty in institutions of higher education in 1940, but only 22 percent in 1969. Since then the situation has not measurably improved. Women's share of service work has increased by almost one-half, from 40 to 59 percent of the service jobs. Women make up the bulk of the household workers; 97 percent in 1970.

Many jobs remain virtually closed to women. Employers viewing job applicants waiting in line for the mid-level and top positions (or even for training slots) do not find women in the queue. Women are in a different line altogether, only rarely competing with men for the better jobs.[9]

Breaking the Cycle

Women of today face economic inequities in opportunities to train for and enter a field, inequities in wages for the same job, inequities in promotion and inequities in the possibilities for increasing one's responsibilities. Increasing the number of women in leadership positions requires internal psychological changes and external institutional changes.[10] If the cycle of

[7] Chafe, William H., *The American Woman, Her Changing Social, Economic, and Political Role*, 1920–1970. New York, Oxford University Press, 1972.

[8] Cross, K. Patricia, "The Education of Women Today and Tomorrow," *The American Woman: Who Will She Be?* Mary Louise McBee and Kathryn A. Blake, eds. Beverly Hills, CA, Glencoe Press, 1974.

[9] Kreps, *Ibid.*

[10] Bardwick, *Ibid.*

women's limited opportunities in the labor force is to be broken many changes will have to be made, both now and in the future.

Women will have to make a careful restatement of their career potentials, aspirations will have to be broadened. Women will have to extend their job search beyond the traditionally female occupations, they will need exposure to a wider range of careers. The adequacy of education for women will have to be questioned for the amount and kind of education a woman has will make a profound difference in her life. Patricia Cross in writing about the education of women today and tomorrow says that no female high school graduate should be permitted to bank her entire economic future with someone else, however reliable, lovable and promising he may seem at eighteen or twenty. High school teachers and counselors will have to be trained so that they are well-informed about the new role of women in the society of tomorrow. Educators will have to understand how the future of women will be profoundly different from that of the past, they will have to comprehend the full implications of the social revolution that is taking place in the lives of women.[11]

Affirmative action policies and programs and an aroused public conscience are beginning to open new opportunities for women. Employers are beginning to view women as serious contenders for the better jobs but societal structures have many changes yet to be made if women are to be encouraged to break the cycle of inequity in which they find themselves.

Visions of New Societal Forms

One of the more visionary suggestions made for new societal forms that would affect the working life of women is made by Jessie Bernard. She sees that the woman of the future is going to be both a mother and a labor force participant. Because of this reality certain changes in social institutions are going to have to be made in behalf of women who are both mothers and workers. Bernard believes that Gosta Rehn's plan for "generalized drawing rights" offers a model which would make it possible to integrate the two roles of worker and mother. This plan is one in which:

> governments and industrial organizations should make it a policy goal to provide the individual with the greatest possible degree of freedom to determine the allocation of his or her own time among different uses. And endeavor should be made to achieve this freedom

[11] Cross, *Ibid.*

> through well-planned and prepared policy programs rather than by reluctantly and belatedly yielding to the social pressures exerted in the direction of greater flexibility. The individual should be free to switch between periods of income-earning work, education or training, childbearing and child care, weekly hours years of schooling and access to adult training and education. . .[12]

Given the popularity of "flexitime" schemes such a possibility may not be as improbable a vision as it might at first appear to be.

If such a plan were implemented Bernard believes that there is a possibility that women would come to see their lives as whole, and plan for the pattern that is going to characterize the lives of at least half of them.[13] This would be a step toward proposing and implementing alternatives that will benefit all people. It would certainly make possible Charlotte Perkins Gilman's dream of a woman's achieving economic independence and it would point the way for a new life of interdependence in which women and men might relate to each other in lifestyles which would enhance the human potentiality for all.

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